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In November 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Cole,1 the first reproductive rights case to reach the court since Gonzales v. Carhart 2 eight 
years before. In the intervening time, states have passed an astonishing number of laws 
and regulations that encroach on women’s access to abortion. Many such laws ostensibly 
aim to protect the woman and her fetus. Yet these same laws do so by imposing medically 
unnecessary and onerous procedural requirements on women,3 which can erect massive 
barriers to abortion access for individuals. Other state laws aim to regulate not the activities 
of women, but those of abortion providers, who are not a protected class. The reproductive 
rights movement terms these laws Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, or TRAP 
laws.4 State legislatures’ passage of TRAP laws accelerated after the Supreme Court’s 
*  J.D. Candidate 2016, Columbia Law School. This piece would not have been possible without the 
guidance of Professor Gillian Metzger. Deep appreciation also goes to Professor Olatunde Johnson for her 
insights, and to Esi Agbemenu, Emma Kaplan, Sarah Mac Dougall, Madeline M. Gomez, Bradley Silverman, 
Andrew Sutton, and the diligent Articles and Production Editors and staff at CJGL for their helpful critiques.
1  Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 
2015), argued sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15-274 (Mar. 2, 2016).
2  Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
3  Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics—
and the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, 16 Guttmacher Pol’y rev. (Spring 2013), http://www.guttmacher.
org/pubs/gpr/16/2/gpr160207.html [http://perma.cc/3WZF-T2VM].
4  See, e.g., Guttmacher Inst., state PolIcIes In BrIef: tarGeted reGulatIons of aBortIon ProvIders 
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf [http://perma.cc/FFZ8-9Q8U]; 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), ctr. for reProd. rIGhts (Aug. 28, 2015), http://reproduct 
iverights.org/en/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap [http://perma.cc/7BMX-G5RH]. 
Despite legislators’ claims that these laws aim to protect women’s safety, courts have recognized their stronger 
motive to make abortions unavailable. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 906, 912 
(7th Cir. 2015) (“But the legislature’s intention to impose the two-day deadline, the effect of which would have 
been to force half the Wisconsin abortion clinics to close for months, is difficult to explain save as a method of 
preventing abortions that women have a constitutional right to obtain.”);
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decision in Carhart, which was taken to signal judicial willingness to uphold state laws 
that aim to protect an unborn fetus at the expense of reducing a woman’s ability to choose.5 
This Note focuses on admitting-privileges laws, a type of TRAP law that requires 
physicians who provide abortions to obtain staff privileges at a hospital within a certain 
distance from their clinics. Without these required privileges, physicians performing 
abortions risk civil and criminal penalties. These laws are especially concerning because 
they give area hospitals an effective veto over a clinic’s operations, effectively outsourcing 
the power to deny licenses to private entities. Admitting-privileges decisions are often 
discretionary for hospital administrators; a hospital’s denial of admitting privileges also 
lacks state oversight or external appeals. 
Admitting-privileges laws are being ratified throughout many states, but have proven 
resistant to traditional substantive due process challenges. In addition to traditional “undue 
burden” analysis, a multipronged approach to reproductive rights litigation and advocacy 
is necessary. Part I of this Note sets forth a brief history of the right to choose an abortion 
and the current federal legal framework. Then, it details recent state legislative and ballot 
initiatives aimed at regulating abortion providers. Part II explains the complications of using 
the “undue burden” doctrine in constitutional challenges to state action, as illuminated by 
recent cases litigating admitting-privileges laws. It further introduces private-delegation 
challenges as an alternative method to examine the constitutionality of  these laws. Part III 
looks at the history of private-delegation challenges with respect to admitting-privileges 
laws and touches on other possible avenues to challenge admitting-privileges regulations.
I. Abortion in the Post-Roe Era 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, which recognized that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right to privacy that extends to a woman’s 
decision to have an abortion.6 Roe’s effect was remarkable. Before Roe, each individual 
state regulated abortions and the accessibility thereof with their traditional police powers. 
At the time of the decision, four states had repealed anti-abortion laws, while thirteen had 
begun reforms of their abortion laws.7 Almost all the rest banned abortion in most cases.8 
5  Carhart, 550 U.S. 124. See also infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
6  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
7  Id. at 140 n.37.
8  Id. at 118.
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After the Supreme Court identified a right to choose an abortion grounded in the federal 
Constitution, the annual number of legal abortions rose through the 1970s, leveling off in 
the 1980s.9 After Roe, the Supreme Court also decided Doe v. Bolton,10 which assessed the 
elaborate procedural barriers to abortion erected by the state of Georgia and invalidated 
some of them for being not reasonably related to the state interest11 or redundant.12 Doe 
has been interpreted to signal that “just as states may not prevent abortion by making the 
performance a crime, states may not make abortions unreasonably difficult to obtain by 
prescribing elaborate procedural barriers.”13
A. Relevant Federal Statutes and Regulations 
Despite Doe’s warning, pro-life lobbyists have encouraged the passage of numerous 
federal statutory limits on abortion. First, Congress passed laws restricting the use of 
federal funds for elective abortions.14 Only four years after Roe, Congress passed the Hyde 
Amendment, banning the use of any federal funds for abortion absent a pregnancy that is 
the result of incest, rape, or that endangers the woman’s life.15 Because the law governs 
Medicaid spending, its effects are disproportionately felt among the poorest populations.16 
Over the years, the reach of the Hyde Amendment has extended to limit the use of federal 
9  Sarah Kliff, Thirteen Charts that Explain How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion Rights, Wash. Post (Jan. 
22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/22/thirteen-charts-that-explain-how-
roe-v-wade-changed-abortion-rights [http://perma.cc/6V2R-N7VB].
10  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
11  Id. at 194–95.
12  Id. at 197.
13  See, e.g., Jon o. shImaBukuro, conG. research serv., rl33467, aBortIon: JudIcIal hIstory and 
leGIslatIve resPonse 2 (2015). 
14  See shImaBukuro, supra note 13, at 8–12. According to the Supreme Court, government failure to fund 
an abortion is not a restriction on the right to an abortion. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977). 
15  The Hyde Amendment is not a permanent law, but a rider routinely attached to annual appropriations 
bills since 1976. See Hyde Amendment Codification Act, S. 142, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s142/text [http://perma.cc/S6PC-ZDJT]; Julie Rovner, Abortion Funding 
Ban Has Evolved Over the Years, nPr (Dec. 14, 2009, 2:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=121402281 [http://perma.cc/R9A3-6V4H]. 
16  Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in the 
United States, Guttmacher Pol’y rev. (2007), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/1/gpr100112.html 
[http://perma.cc/WKH4-Y7F2]. 
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funds for abortion for federal employees and women in the Indian Health Service.17
Congress also passed “conscience” laws, including the Church Amendments,18 which 
codify exemptions from any hypothetical federal requirement to provide abortions, if a 
hospital receiving certain federal funds or their employees object on the basis of religious 
or moral beliefs. Importantly, the Church Amendments also govern hospital personnel 
decisions. They prohibit any entity receiving money from certain federal entities from 
discriminating against any physician or other health care worker on the basis of their 
decision either to perform or abstain from performing an abortion.19
Over the years, Congress has also introduced more targeted legislation regulating 
elective abortions. Certain second trimester abortions are criminalized by the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 200320—namely the procedure of intact dilation and extraction, or 
partial-birth abortion, upheld by the Supreme Court in 2007 and discussed infra.21  Most 
recently, the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act (PPACA)22 was passed into law, 
creating collateral consequences for access to abortion that largely preserved the status 
quo.23 Under the PPACA, coverage for abortion services may not be required as part of the 
federally established essential benefits package.24 Although private health plan providers 
17  Alina Salganicoff et al., Coverage for Abortion Services and the ACA, kaIser fam. found. (Sept. 19, 
2014), http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-and-the-aca/ [http://
perma.cc/7GKY-GCBY].
18  42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2012). 
19  42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1).
20  18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
21  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); infra note 146–48 and accompanying text.
22  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119. 
23  In 2010, Obama issued an executive order essentially consistent with the Hyde Amendment. The order 
was a political concession aimed at persuading Democratic House Representative Bart Stupak to support the 
PPACA. David Corn, Obama and the Hyde Amendment, mother Jones (Mar. 24, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.
motherjones.com/mojo/2010/03/obama-and-hyde-amendment [http://perma.cc/LFD2-ABHQ]. The Obama 
Administration has also revised a regulation from the Bush administration permitting workers in health care 
settings to refuse to provide advice, information, or services on contraception based on moral objections. 
Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 
9968, 9969 (Feb. 23, 2011) (amending 45 C.F.R. Part 88). Among the conditions of the PPACA are new 
healthcare provider conscience protections governing the health insurance exchanges. Exec. Order No. 13535, 
Ensuring Enforcement and Implementation of Abortion Restrictions in the ACA (Mar. 24, 2010).
24  Salganicoff et al., supra note 17.
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may choose to fund abortions, at least one plan within a state Marketplace must be limited 
in its coverage only to those types of abortions funded by federal law.25 State Medicaid is 
likewise constrained by the Hyde Amendment; under that law, Medicaid may not cover 
abortions beyond the cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest.26 If providers do cover 
procedures in situations beyond those permitted by federal law, these procedures must be 
paid from a separate funding pool segregated from federal funds.27 
Progress of federal abortion legislation remains stalled. First, the PPACA leaves state 
abortion regulations untouched. States may continue to pass laws that completely prohibit 
insurance coverage for any abortions by plans sold in their state Marketplace, even for 
pregnancies that result from rape or incest, or threaten a woman’s life.28 Moreover, legislation 
directly concerning the right to choose an abortion has stalled. Senate Democrats recently 
blocked a bill that would have banned most abortions after twenty weeks of pregnancy.29 The 
Hyde Amendment Codification Act, which aims to make the Hyde Amendment permanent 
law instead of a yearly rider, was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions in January and has not since emerged.30 Meanwhile, the same Congress is 
also considering S. 1696, or the Women’s Health Protection Act, which aims to prohibit 
state regulations passed under the pretext of protecting women’s health that suppress 
abortion provision.31 The Act was reintroduced in Congress in 2015 and has also not yet 





29  See Pain Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 36, 114th Cong. (2015–16), https://www.congress.
gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/36 [http://perma.cc/4L88-JE43]; Ted Barrett, Senate Dems Block GOP 
Abortion Bill, CNN (Sept. 22, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/22/politics/congress-abortion-
planned-parenthood [http://perma.cc/QVF5-RVBW].
30  Hyde Amendment Codification Act, supra note 15; S. 219, 114th Congress (2014), https://www.congress.
gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/219 [http://perma.cc/7BA4-H9KY]. 
31  S. 217, 114th Congress (2014), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s217/BILLS-114s217is.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9CMZ-LGED]. See also H.R. 448, 114th Congress (2015), conGress.Gov, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/448 [http://perma.cc/974T-6KCU].
32  See H.R. 448, supra note 31; Emily Crockett, Democrats Reintroduce Legislation to Protect Abortion 
Access, rh realIty check (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:55 Pm), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2015/01/21/democrats-
reintroduce-legislation-protect-abortion-access [http://perma.cc/TB6D-FKYV].
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has passed the Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act,33 which requires health care 
practitioners present when a fetus is “born alive” following an abortion to exercise the 
same degree of care necessary to preserve the life of a fetus born at the same gestational 
age.34 
II. State Regulations of Abortions 
Although abortion services expanded significantly after Roe,35 state-level restrictions 
have also increased—especially recently—under the impetus of pro-life lawmakers and 
advocates.36 Two years before Roe, Americans United for Life (AUL) was established to 
spread pro-life policies, aiming to overturn Roe through federal legislation.37 AUL also 
claims credit for pioneering the state-based model legislative strategy38 that has spread 
largely identical abortion regulations throughout the States and is likewise espoused by 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). Established the same year that Roe 
was decided, ALEC is known for uniting conservative legislators, policy analysts, and 
representatives from corporations to create model state legislation embodying conservative 
policies.39 Together with other conservative lobbying groups such as National Right to Life 
33  H.R. 3504, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3504 
[http://perma.cc/FZ3B-R3Z5].
34  Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act, S. 2066, 114th Cong. (2015), http://www.sasse.senate.
gov/public/_cache/files/a3cab92b-d02e-4f8e-8221-65976d359bec/born-alive-abortion-survivors-protection-
act.pdf [http://perma.cc/FB99-HJ65]. The bill is currently on calendar to be considered by the Senate.
35  Willard Cates, Jr., David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, The Public Health Impact of Legal Abortion: 
30 Years Later, 35 PersP. on sexual & reProd. health 25, 25 (2003), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
journals/3502503.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9RV-HWKT].
36  See More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011–2013 Than in the Entire Previous Decade, 
Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2014/01/02/index.html [http://
perma.cc/53C6-CHS3] [hereinafter More State Abortion Restrictions].
37  About, am. unIted for lIfe, http://www.aul.org/about-aul [http://perma.cc/B5AA-QD5Z] (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015). 
38  Charmaine Yoest, am. unIted for lIfe, http://www.aul.org/about-aul/charmaine-yoest [http://perma.cc/ 
6TF6-727T] (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
39  Alan Greenblatt, ALEC Enjoys a New Wave of Influence and Criticism, GovernInG (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/ALEC-enjoys-new-wave-influence-criticism.html [http://perma.cc/
MU5C-NRV9]. ALEC’s goals include bolstering charter schools, union-busting right to work laws, and climate 
change denial. See Natasha Lennard, ALEC Makes Public Hundreds of “Model” Bills, salon (Mar. 15, 2013 
5:25 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/alec_makes_public_hundreds_of_model_bills [http://perma.cc/
W8Q3-RQEW].
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(NRTL),40 these organizations create and promote pro-life model legislation implemented 
throughout the states. 
In the years following Roe, lower federal courts have invalidated many abortion 
regulations. State legislators responded in turn by limiting public funding for abortions or 
regulating the primary conduct of women with measures such as mandatory counseling 
periods.41 In the 1990s, AUL pivoted to a strategy of incrementally increasing state-imposed 
restrictions on a woman’s right to choose.42 Concurrently, state focus on regulating clinics 
and other elective abortion providers (rather than the woman herself) reemerged in the 
1990s and has accelerated since.43 
A. State Measures
Due to deadlock at the federal level, the real arena of the abortion access struggle is 
state-by-state. In the last two decades, state statutes regulating abortion have become more 
artfully drafted under the influence of multi-pronged pro-life legislative and regulatory 
campaigns. In 2005, the AUL began annually releasing Defending Life, a State-By-State 
Legal Guide to Abortion, Bioethics, and the End of Life.44 Self-styled as “‘the playbook’ 
of model legislation” in 2005, Defending Life aggregates more than fifty pieces of model 
legislation, expert analysis, and report cards into a handbook for legislators. Other than 
publishing the model legislation45 handbooks, pro-life groups have also sponsored state 
ballot measures in order to create popular support for increased abortion regulations.46 
40  nat’l rIGht to lIfe, http://www.nrlc.org [http://perma.cc/Z63G-ZHNZ] (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
Twelve states have passed laws based on NRTL model legislation. See Pain Capable Unborn Child Protection 
Act, nat’l rIGht to lIfe (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/stateleg/PCUCPAfactsheet.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8GB7-2NEW]. 
41  Gold & Nash, supra note 3.
42  Kate Sheppard, Wham, Bam, Sonogram! Meet the Ladies Setting the New Pro-Life Agenda, mother 
Jones (Sept./Oct. 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/americans-united-for-life-anti-abort 
ion-transvaginal-ultrasound [http://perma.cc/4JS8-WBSQ].
43  See More State Abortion Restrictions, supra note 36.
44  Defending Life 2015: 10th Anniversary Edition, am. unIted for lIfe, http://www.aul.org/defending-
life-2015 [http://perma.cc/XT7R-Y3BT] (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
45  For a model admitting-privileges act, see Abortion Providers’ Admitting Privileges Act, am. unIted 
for lIfe, http://www.aul.org/downloads/2015-Legislative-Guides/Abortion/Abortion_Providers_Admitting_
Privileges_Act_-_2015_LG.pdf [http://perma.cc/5EGX-FBBE].
46  Nicholas Riccardi, Abortion Foes’ Strategy Advances, l.a. tImes (nov. 23, 2007), http://www.latimes.
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Tennessee, a state in which abortion regulations must satisfy strict scrutiny under the higher 
protections provided under the state constitution,47 recently ratified a state constitutional 
amendment that gives Tennessee legislators a mandate to create new abortion regulations.48 
The battle spills into county politics as well. In St. Joseph County, Indiana, a proposed bill 
required that the name of the doctor providing admitting privileges be filed with the county 
health department and made publicly available.49
Since 2011, states have enacted more than two hundred abortion regulations.50 These 
regulations include limitations on insurance coverage of abortion, bans on abortions at and 
after twenty weeks, limitations on medical abortion, and bans on abortions if the provider 
knows that the woman is obtaining the abortion for sex-selection purposes.51 Other laws 
incidentally reduced access to abortion. These laws mandate parental involvement, waiting 
periods, counseling, and ultrasounds for pregnant women.52 Currently, twenty-four states 
have enacted laws or policies that regulate abortion providers, limit medication abortion 
com/news/la-na-egg23nov23-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/P3VU-ATUB].
47  Op. Att’y. Gen. No. 05-071, May 3, 2005, 2005 UL 1182346 (clarifying the strict scrutiny standard 
governing privacy rights imposed by Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 
2000)). 
48  The text of the Amendment reads:
 
Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to abortion or requires the funding 
of an abortion. The people retain the right through their elected state representatives and 
state senators to enact, amend, or repeal statutes regarding abortion, including, but not 
limited to, circumstances of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or when necessary to 
save the life of the mother. 
How Will Amendment 1 Read on the Ballot?, yes on 1, http://www.yeson1tn.org/amendment_text 
[http://perma.cc/VD2U-38DK] (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). See also Anita Wadhwani, Tennessee Amendment 
1 Abortion Measure Passes, tennessean, nov. 6, 2014, http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/
politics/2014/11/04/amendment-takes-early-lead/18493787/ [http://perma.cc/D5ZJ-NTNP].
49  Amanda Gray, County Councilman Changes Admitting Privileges Bill – Again, s. Bend trIB. (Mar. 
4, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://www.southbendtribune.com/news/local/county-councilman-changes-admitting-priv 
ileges-bill----again/article_e102baa1-6326-5fd9-b781-5885ba185851.html [http://perma.cc/5TSP-H89R].
50  More State Abortion Restrictions, supra note 36.
51  Id. See also nat’l Women’s laW ctr., 2014 state level aBortIon restrIctIons: an extreme overreach 
Into Women’s reProductIve health care (2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2014_state_
abortion_legislation_factsheet_1.22.15v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/2M7A-K2LW].
52  2014 state level aBortIon restrIctIons, supra note 51.
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provision, ban private insurance coverage of abortion, and ban abortions after twenty weeks 
of pregnancy.53 States enacted ninety-three measures from 2011 through 2013, compared 
with twenty-two in total from 2001 through 2010.54 The number of states considered hostile 
to abortion rights more than doubled from thirteen in the year 2000 to twenty-seven in the 
year 2013.55 
Fifty-six percent of abortion restrictions enacted in 2013 looked to limit women’s 
access to abortion.56 In 2014, four states passed targeted regulations of abortion providers—
Louisiana and Oklahoma passed laws requiring abortion providers to obtain admitting 
privileges, while Arizona and Indiana passed laws to allow unannounced inspections of 
abortion facilities.57 The escalating passage of these laws is cause for alarm for reproductive 
rights advocates, women desiring abortions, and abortion providers. 
B. State Regulations of Abortion Providers 
Some state restrictions are instituted in the form of TRAP laws, which regulate the 
medical services component of the abortion process. Notwithstanding the conservative-
values-based condemnation that underlies their passage, TRAP laws resemble laws 
regulating medical procedures58 instead of seeking to influence the pregnant woman’s 
decision directly. This characteristic makes TRAP laws and their application to individual 
physicians and clinics open to legal challenge through advocacy as well as litigation, 
as evaluation of each case must involve some consultation of the medical literature and 
evaluation of the proper relationship between scientific fact and morality legislation. 
Three general types of laws regulating abortion providers exist: health facility licensing 
schemes, ambulatory surgical center requirements, and hospitalization requirements.59 
53  Id. See also state PolIcIes In BrIef, supra note 4; More State Abortion Restrictions, supra note 36. 
54  Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Providers—and the 
Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 Guttmacher Pol’y rev. 9, 10 (2014).
55  Id. at 10, 11.
56  More State Abortion Restrictions, supra note 36.
57  2014 state laW aBortIon restrIctIons, supra note 51. 
58  nat’l aBortIon fed’n, the traP: tarGeted reGulatIon of aBortIon ProvIders 1, 1 (2007), 
http://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/trap_laws.pdf [http://perma.cc/LBW6-KJRH].
59  Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): Avoiding the TRAP, ctr. for reProd. rIGhts (Nov. 
1, 2007), http://www.reproductiverights.org/node/611 [http://perma.cc/GA47-ECCG] [hereinafter Avoiding the 
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Each impose requirements beyond what is medically necessary and frequently beyond what 
is practically or financially feasible for physicians and clinics.60 Health facility licensing 
schemes require only abortion facilities—not similar outpatient procedure facilities—to 
become state-licensed and comply with a range of regulations. These regulations, that often 
govern construction, staffing, and other procedures, were designed for ambulatory surgical 
centers (ASCs), even though these centers provide more invasive and risky procedures than 
abortion.61 Ambulatory surgical center requirements mandate that abortion providers not 
only meet the standards crafted for ASCs but also be licensed as ASCs.62 Hospitalization 
requirements demand that patients be hospitalized for abortions after the fetus has reached 
a certain gestational age.63 
C. Admitting-Privileges Laws and the Privileging Process
Admitting-privileges laws are one of the most common health facility licensing-scheme 
laws. Currently, sixteen states require or will require abortion facilities or their clinicians 
to have connections to a local hospital.64 Thirteen states have required that doctors who 
perform abortions have an affiliation with a local hospital: five require providers to possess 
admitting privileges,65 while eight states require either admitting privileges or an alternative 
arrangement, such as an inter-physician agreement with another doctor who has admitting 
TRAP].
60  Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), ctr. for reProd. rIGhts (Aug. 28, 2015), http://
www.reproductiverights.org/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap [http://perma.cc/Y6AN-
CFDN]. See also infra notes 96–99, 118–124, and accompanying text.
61  Gold & Nash, supra note 3. Several of these laws are extremely detailed, specifying building requirements 
such as hallway widths or the sizes of procedural rooms, specifications unnecessary to accommodating 
a gurney used to transport a patient in case of an emergency. ASCs provide same-day surgical care as an 
alternative to hospital-based outpatient procedures—including pain management surgery, urology, orthopedics, 
plastic surgery, gastrointestinal surgery, and ophthalmology services. What is an ASC?, asc ass’n, 
http://www.ascassociation.org/AdvancingSurgicalCare/whatisanasc [http://perma.cc/R5QT-GVLH] (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2015). 
62  Avoiding the TRAP, supra note 59. 
63  Id.
64  state PolIcIes In BrIef, supra note 4 (adding states with clinician requirements to states requiring transfer 
arrangements with hospitals).
65  The five states are Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have hospital-privileges requirements enjoined pending a final decision 
in the courts. Id.
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privileges.66 One state requires that the clinician be either a board-certified obstetrician-
gynecologist or eligible for certification.67 
These requirements ask physicians to undergo the credentialing and privileging process 
typically used in hospitals to grant or deny admitting or staff privileges for independent 
physicians.68 The specific process to obtain admitting privileges differs from hospital to 
hospital and may be subject to different state guidelines. A grant of privileges creates an 
association between that hospital and the admitted physician such that the physician can, 
depending on the privileges granted, admit her patients or use the surgical facilities.69 
Hospitals are accordingly discerning about applicants’ competency to treat patients. The 
process is typically split into two parts: credentialing and privileging.70 Credentialing is 
the process by which a practitioner’s qualifications are assessed, while privileging is the 
process by which a health care organization such as a hospital authorizes a practitioner to 
provide certain services based on the practitioner’s demonstrated competence.71
As information about the credentialing and privileging process is often individual to 
hospitals and hard to come by, this Note relies on examples assumed to be representative 
66  Id.
67  Id.
68  See infra notes 70–71. 
69  Virginia McCollum, Credentialing and Privileging-Implementing Process, JoInt comm’n on accredIt-
atIon of healthcare orGs. (Jcaho), (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.jointcommission.org/musingsambulatory_
patient_safety/guest_blogger_virginia_mccollum_credentialing_and_privileging-implementing_a_process/ 
[http://perma.cc/4HG2-RWVJ].
70  See generally Policy 21: Physician Credentialing and Privileging, am. coll. of med. QualIty, 
http://acmq.org/policies/policy21.pdf [http://perma.cc/9AJT-UUTC] (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
71  See McCollum, supra note 69. The credentialing and privileging processes are based on standards set 
by national accrediting organizations (including the JCAHO or the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory 
Health Care Inc. (AAAHC)); JCHAO, amBulatory care ProGram: the Who, What, When, and Where’s 
of credentIalInG and PrIvIleGInG, http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/AHC_who_what_when_and_
where_credentialing_booklet.pdf [http://perma.cc/S3ZP-8ULS]; The Credentialing and Privileging Issue, 
AAAHC (May 2013), https://www.aaahc.org/Global/pdfs/Connection/2013%20May%20Connection_Final.
pdf [http://perma.cc/H4PU-LVE9]. The federal Bureau of Primary Health Care endorses and supports these 
standards. Hospitals that take part in the Federal Torts Claims Act are required by law to adopt credentialing 
and privileging processes. See Credentialing and Privileging of Health Center Practitioners, Memorandum from 
Marilyn Hughes Gaston, M.D., Dir., Bureau of Primary Health Care, to All Bureau of Primary Health Care 
Programs (July 17, 2001), http://bphc.hrsa.gov/policiesregulations/policies/pdfs/pin200116.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
EC56-LHJE].
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of a typical process. The processes will differ at each hospital depending on the set of 
industry standards followed and the operant legal regime. At Houston Methodist Hospital, 
the credentialing process occurs in three stages.72 The doctor must initiate the process by 
submitting documentation of their qualifications, including education, training, board 
certification, valid licensure, and explanation of any malpractice claim history.73 First, the 
hospital verifies that the information provided is true.74 Second, the hospital committee 
reviews the information gathered by the applicant.75 Finally, the hospital committee 
assesses whether the applicant qualifies for the specific medical staff position for which she 
has applied.76 While some of the process is standardized by the federal Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services,77 a large amount of discretion is committed to the hospital.78 After 
credentialing, the hospital makes a decision about whether to grant privileges and what 
privileges to grant.79 In total, the processing time can range from weeks to months.80
Typically, the medical staff (comprised mostly of other physicians) makes a decision 
whether to grant or deny the privileges, although the final decision officially issues from 
the hospital’s board of directors.81 Generally, practicing physicians are often organized 
into self-governing medical staffs, which form medical peer review panels that decide 
72  Veronica Zaragovia, What It Takes For Texas Abortion Doctors To Get Admitting Privileges, 
kut.orG (Feb. 19, 2014), http://kut.org/post/what-it-takes-texas-abortion-doctors-get-admitting-privileges 
[http://perma.cc/Y4D4-8385].
73  For a sample list of required documentation, see Medical/Dental Staff Application Check List, kaleIda 
health, https://www.kaleidahealth.org/providers/support/KaleidaHealth-MD-Application.pdf [http://perma.
cc/677C-GADW].




78  See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 791–93 (7th Cir. 2013).
79  Frequently Asked Questions about Credentialing and Privileges, kaleIda health, http://www.
kaleidahealth.org/providers/application_FAQs.asp [http://perma.cc/SJ2B-BB53] (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
80  See Medical/Dental Staff Application Check List, supra note 73. 
81  Sharon A. Christie, Note, Denial of Hospital Admitting Privileges for Non-Physician Providers—A Per 
Se Antitrust Violation?, 60 notre dame l. rev. 724, 730 (1985) (noting that the decentralized decision-making 
structure of the privileges increases the risk of group boycott, or a concerted refusal to deal or grant privileges 
to an individual). 
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whether a doctor will be granted staff privileges, or whether his privileges should be 
revoked for cause.82 Depending on the state, the record of committee decision-making may 
be confidential and protected by state law from discovery in civil suit.83 
The issue of transparency surrounding the hospital’s decision-making is compounded 
by the larger social context. Hospitals are large facilities: some are religious entities,84 
others are reliant on religious donors, and still others are publicly supported institutions 
subject to local social and government pressures.85 They are more susceptible than women’s 
clinics to being influenced by strong outrage about the very provision of abortions.86 When 
hospitals are associated with universities, for example, local pro-life organizations have 
pressured the hospitals to revoke their transfer agreements with local abortion providers on 
the theory that the existence of the transfer agreement is tantamount to taxpayer funding of 
abortion.87 Other university hospitals have demurred from providing admitting privileges 
to physicians that perform abortions, wary of associating with “what [the administrator] 
considered to be a politically contentious organization and procedure . . . .”88 
After receiving admitting privileges, the physician must maintain them. Maintenance 
requirements can be clerical in nature—such as maintaining the currency of expirable 
documents such as medical licenses, malpractice insurance, and board certifications.89 
82  Josephine M. Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical Peer Review Process, 9 J. contemP. health 
l. & Pol’y 419, 419 (1993).
83  Id. at 440–41. 
84  See Jessica Mason Pieklo, Did Wisconsin Anti-Choice Lawmakers Accidentally Force Catholic Hospitals 
to Grant Admitting Privileges to Abortion Clinics?, rh realIty check (Aug. 13, 2013), http://rhrealitycheck.
org/article/2013/08/13/did-wisconsin-anti-choice-lawmakers-accidentally-force-catholic-hospitals-to-grant-
admitting-privileges-to-abortion-clinics/ [http://perma.cc/8394-S4NJ].
85  See Robin Marty, Ohio Shows How an ‘Admitting Privileges’ Requirement Can Become a Backdoor 
Abortion Ban, rh realIty check (Apr. 5, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/04/05/ohio-
shows-how-an-admitting-privileges-requirement-can-become-a-backdoor-abortion-ban/ [http://perma.cc/ 
TKG2-WUBE]; Sandhya Somashekhar, Admitting-privileges Laws Have Created High Hurdle 
for Abortion Providers To Clear, Wash. Post (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/2014/08/10/62554324-1d88-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html [http://perma.cc/LS8F-CYUF]; see 
also infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
86  Marty, supra note 85.
87  Id.; Somashekhar, supra note 85.
88  Id.
89  Frequently Asked Questions about Credentialing and Privileges, supra note 79.
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Others have a financial aspect: hospitals often mandate that physicians bring to the hospital 
a minimum number of patients per year.90 Still another type is a residency requirement 
commanding the physician to live within the area.91 
Aside from each specific hospital’s individual privileging and maintainance require-
ments, state law imposes further limitations, which vary in their severity. The more lenient 
have wider qualifying distances and provide the option for a physician to either obtain 
admitting privileges or have a written transfer agreement with a local hospital. Another 
iteration requires the physician to have an agreement with another physician with admitting 
privileges. The most stringent laws dictate a small qualifying distance to the nearest 
hospital, or require the physician herself to have admitting privileges, or else face a range 
of civil and criminal penalties.92  
D. The Trouble with Admitting-Privileges Laws 
Pro-life legislators evoke safety concerns when passing admitting-privileges laws. 
One common justification for admitting-privileges laws is that they facilitate continuity 
of care: abortion providers would be able to provide ongoing care in a hospital setting in 
the case of a complication.93 Another common justification is that they compel an out-of-
town abortion provider to develop a connection to the local area—and by extension, their 
patients.94 Lastly, pro-life advocates justify their admitting-privilege requirement as peer 
evaluation: the process of applying for admitting privileges provides another chance to 
evaluate a doctor’s competency and suitability as a medical services provider.95
These justifications, though not facially unreasonable, nonetheless demand that 
physicians and clinics make extraneous and often medically unnecessary efforts. Surgical 
abortions are safer than tonsillectomies, while the risks of medical abortions are even 
90  Zaragovia, supra note 72.
91  Brian Lyman, Judge Rules AL Abortion Clinic Law Unconstitutional, montGomery advertIser (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/politics/southunionstreet/2014/08/04/federal-judge-
rules-abortion-clinic-law-unconstitutional/13569555/ [http://perma.cc/9Y3G-G9WN]. 
92  See, e.g., 25 tex. admIn. code §§ 139.32, 139.33, 139.53 (2009). 
93  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 973–77 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2015).
94  Gold & Nash, supra note 3.
95  Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 977–980. 
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lower, as they do not require any anesthesia or invasive surgery.96 In many states where the 
few abortion clinics that are available are located in a metropolitan area, a rural resident 
may likely seek care from a hospital closer to her than the hospital at which the clinic or 
doctor obtained admitting privileges.97 In the case of any complication that would require 
hospitalization, the hospital is obligated to admit a patient to emergency care whether or 
not her doctor has admitting privileges.98 The patient is frequently treated whether or not 
she is linked to a physician with admitting privileges.99 Thus, continuity of care is often 
gratuitous.
Secondly, since surgical abortions are specialized outpatient procedures that commonly 
take very little time and abortion services are so difficult to access in several regions in 
the United States, sustained doctor-patient relationships or close ties between a physician 
and the local area are, while laudable, often also impracticable. A doctor’s developing a 
connection to the local region may not correlate with a stronger doctor-patient relationship 
or increase existing patient protections. Finally, since all states require that a physician 
who provides medical care to a patient be licensed to practice medicine in that state, the 
state medical board has already completed a close evaluation of a doctor’s competency to 
practice medicine.100 
Major medical associations also maintain that admitting-privileges requirements are 
medically unnecessary and detrimental to the practice of physicians providing abortion.101 
96  What Are The Possible Complications?, am. Women’s servs., http://www.americanwomensservices.
com/faq/complications.php [http://perma.cc/QY3M-LAJL] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
97  See Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 976 (“[I]t is simply not credible that plaintiffs’ patients would never-
theless insist on transport to a hospital . . . where the physician who performed the original abortion has 
admitting privileges, . . . in light of the likely distance from the patient’s home, limitations on travel, and 
challenges to access to healthcare confronted by women living in poverty . . . .”).
98  As guaranteed by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd (2012).
99  Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 975.
100 Report to the House of Delegates, 2008, am. Bar ass’n, health l. sectIon, http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/health/04_government_sub/media/116B_Tele_Final.authcheckdam.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ZX6D-ZQBT] (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
101 See Jenna Jerman et al., am. PuB. health ass’n, Opposition to Requirements for Hospital Admitting 
Privileges and Transfer Agreements for Abortion Providers, http://www.apha.org/~/media/files/pdf/policy/
a1_oppositiontoadmitting.ashx [http://perma.cc/3QWY-MKDA] (stating that the 2003 Ten Core Principles 
requiring physicians performing surgery in office settings to have admitting privileges at a local hospital 
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The American Medical Association (AMA) takes the stance that many TRAP laws 
are unnecessary and impede public health objectives. The AMA has filed a number of 
amicus briefs in recent abortion-related cases. The association came out against Texas’s 
admitting-privileges law, instead supporting the physician’s right to practice ethical 
medicine “without concern that such exercise will run afoul of non-medical, legal 
restrictions.”102 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has also stated 
its opposition to admitting-privileges and other TRAP laws because of their lack of medical 
necessity.103 Even some local health boards have vocally opposed admitting privileges 
regualtions, stating that no “demonstrable, factual statistical data” has shown a need for 
these measures, and that “there is generally no support from the medical community” for 
an ordinance that requires admitting privileges and public disclosure of those doctors who 
have such privileges.104
Besides the absence of medical necessity, admitting-privileges laws subject doctors 
to requirements that can be difficult to satisfy. First, residency requirements can exclude 
physicians from operating. Because many abortion providers operate in several different 
states, traveling in and out-of-state for a limited number of procedures, such providers 
frequently cannot meet a residency requirement in multiple stands.105 Moreover, a hospital-
is a recommendation that may be outdated, as they were never revisited); fla. allIance of Planned 
Parenthood affIlIates, Inc., medIcal exPerts oPPose admIttInG PrIvIleGes laWs, http://fappa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Med-Experts-on-Admitting-Privileges-2015-01-16v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/5U9P-
BG2V]; infra notes 105–107. But see Sarah Terzo, Abortion doctors and Admitting Privileges – Are Clinics 
Being Treated Unfairly?, lIveactIonneWs (Nov. 13, 2013), http://liveactionnews.org/abortion-doctors-and-
admitting-privileges-are-clinics-being-treated-unfairly/ [http://perma.cc/4SBX-3D5V].
102 Case Summaries: Abortion, Planned Parenthood of Greater TX Surgical Health Services v. Abbott, 
am. med. ass’n, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/litigation-center/case-
summaries-topic/abortions.page? [http://perma.cc/2JRQ-NMF8] (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
103 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American 
Medical Association in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and in Support of Affirmance, Planned Parenthood of 
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-51008), http://www.acog.
org/-/media/News-Releases/20131220Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/M4MS-WL5C]. 
104 Amanda Gray, Health Board Opposes Local Admitting Privileges Bill, s. Bend trIB. (Mar. 10, 2015, 
6:33 AM), http://www.southbendtribune.com/news/health-board-opposes-local-admitting-privileges-bill/
article_611ab766-c6af-11e4-a733-5b387c6a9d7a.html [http://perma.cc/SM86-EM2B]; Megan Hickey, St. Joe 
Co. Abortion Ordinance Fails By 6-3 Vote, WNDU (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.wndu.com/home/headlines/
St-Joe-Co-abortion-ordinance-fails-by-6-3-vote--295855241.html [http://perma.cc/F97E-77ZK].
105 Id.; Campbell Robinson & Eric Eckholm, Judge Blocks Abortion Curb in Mississippi, n.y. tImes (July 
29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/us/mississippi-abortion-clinic-federal-court-blocks-closing.
html [http://perma.cc/R545-SZBE].
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imposed quota of admitted patients per year can be preclusive.106 Mandating an abortion 
provider to regularly bring in patients to the hospital places her in a double-bind because, 
when done correctly, surgical and medical abortions are safe procedures that rarely require 
hospitalization.107
Compared with other medical procedures and especially with childbirth, abortion is 
extremely safe.108 Only 0.3 percent of abortion patients in the United States experience a 
complication that requires hospitalization.109 Major complications occur in first trimester 
abortions at a rate of only 0.05–0.06 percent, while second-trimester abortions have a 1.3 
percent major complication rate.110 The risk of dying from childbirth is approximately 
fourteen times higher than that of dying from abortion.111 Furthermore, nearly all United 
States abortions take place in nonhospital settings, with zero detriment in patient safety; 
studies have found no difference in the risk of death between procedures performed in a 
hospital and those performed in a clinic or a physician’s office.112 
Previous academic commentators examining admitting privileges from the antitrust 
context have argued that the decentralized decision-making structure of the hospital 
encourages “group boycott” of outsider medical providers, because it may give power to 
106 Robinson & Eckholm, supra note 106.
107 See Gold & Nash, supra note 3. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
769 F.3d 330, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2014) (mem.); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 
949, 984–85 (W.D. Wis. 2015).
108 Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legally Induced Abortion and 
Childbirth in the United States, 119 oBstetrIcs & GynecoloGy 215 (2012); Gold & Nash, supra note 3. See 
also Tracy A. Weitz et al., Safety of Aspiration Abortion Performed by Nurse Practitioners, Certified Nurse 
Midwives, and Physician Assistants Under a California Legal Waiver, 103 am. J. PuB. health 454, 457–58 
(2013).
109 See Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health Perspective, in a 
clInIcIan’s GuIde to medIcal and surGIcal aBortIon 11, 22 (Maureen Paul et al. eds., 1999). See also Planned 
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing studies showing that the incidence 
of complications requiring hospital admissions is one-twentieth of one percent).
110 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc., v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2015).
111 Raymond & Grimes, supra note 108, at 215–19. Nonetheless, many states permit home births under 
the direction of midwives, who need not be licensed physicians. See State by State, mIdWIves all. n. am., 
http://mana.org/about-midwives/state-by-state [https://perma.cc/DG99-HG6M] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
112 David A. Grimes, et al., Abortion Facilities and the Risk of Death, 13 fam. Plan. PersPs. 30, 30–32 
(1981).
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effectively license a health care provider to her competitors.113 Group boycott is defined 
as a concerted refusal to deal with a competitor, by “keep[ing] them from entering the 
field or . . . driv[ing] existing competitors out of the field.”114 Effects of group boycott 
include putting the competitor at a competitive disadvantage, reducing the competitor’s 
revenues, or raising the competitor’s costs.115 The hospital decision-making structure, in 
conjunction with the state admitting-privileges mandate, thus exacerbates the result of a 
staff’s concerted refusal to deal with a provider.116 
Whether through endogenous factors like religious disapproval or exogenous pressure, 
hospitals are frequently unwilling to grant or even consider granting admitting privileges 
even where the abortion provider is capable of meeting their requirements. Doctors 
have relayed stories of hospitals unwilling to give out applications, under the apparent 
justification that hospital policy was to only consider doctors recommended by current 
physicians at that hospital. Furthermore, lack of institutional transparency can be a major 
problem not just at the initial stages of requesting applications. Hospitals can and do cite 
“failures to meet other standards,” such as the admitting privileges quota, or that “none of 
its staff would write letters in support of the doctors,” as the reasons for denial, neglecting 
to refer to the underlying causes of, for example, the refusal to write letters: political 
difference, religious disapproval, or avoidance of public outcry.117 
Institutional reluctance has caused major repercussions. In the last few years, providers 
at Mississippi’s sole abortion clinic could not obtain admitting privileges at any of seven 
area hospitals.118 Within the year after Texas’ admitting-privileges law was passed, around 
113 See Christie, supra note 81, at 726 n.16. The abortion context admittedly involves non-economic motives 
and fits uneasily in the typical antitrust framework, as the hospital staff is unlikely to compete to provide 
abortion services. However, group boycott in the abortion context shares the same underlying purpose as in a 
typical economic context: to prevent a physician from providing services in association with a hospital.
114 See id.
115 Robert Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept ‘Group Boycott,’ 39 vand. l. rev. 
1507, 1509 (1986).
116 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2013).
117 See, e.g., Ahmed, infra note 289. 
118 Sherry Colb, The Fifth Circuit Blocks Mississippi Law From Closing the Last Abortion Clinic, verdIct 
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/08/19/fifth-circuit-blocks-mississippi-law-closing-last-abort 
ion-clinic [http://perma.cc/T4HN-ZCJU].
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 56730.2
half of the state’s thirty-six clinics closed.119 One Texas physician who provided abortions 
had his medical license temporary suspended after he was found to have conducted his 
business without obtaining admitting privileges at an area hospital.120 Three of Alabama’s 
five clinics would have closed absent an injunction granted pending the district court’s 
final decision.121 In Oklahoma, a doctor who performs about half of the abortions in the 
state and is one of only three providers in the state could not obtain admitting privileges at 
any of the sixteen hospitals in qualifying distance of his clinic.122 The wrangling required 
to obtain admitting privileges not only deters physicians from starting clinics, but has also 
contributed to an economic climate deterring new doctors from entering the reproductive 
health services market altogether.123  
Legislators have deliberately taken advantage of these collateral effects of asking 
hospitals to grant admitting-privileges.124 State legislative efforts to pass hospital admitting-
privileges laws show no signs of slowing; further bills have been introduced or enacted 
in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, 
Ohio, and South Carolina.125 The response by reproductive rights advocates has been to 
apply for injunctions and to challenge these laws on the merits, under the Casey undue 
burden standard.
119 Cameron McWhirter & Arian Campo-Flores, Federal Court Blocks Mississippi Law Threatening 
Abortion Clinic, Wall st. J. (July 29, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/federal-court-blocks-mississippi-
law-threatening-abortion-clinic-1406670053 [http://perma.cc/JDP4-KRUX].
120  Zaragovia, supra note 72.
121 Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1278–79 (M.D. Ala. 2014); Somashekhar, 
supra note 85.
122 Judge Hears Oral Arguments Over Okla. Admitting Privileges Laws, rePro health Watch (Oct. 20, 
2014), http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=45870 [http://perma.cc/MM6Z-
95EY].
123 W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson, No. 2:15CV497-MHT, 2015 WL 4873125, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 
13, 2015); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2013).
124 Gold & Nash, supra note 3 (quoting a member of the Mississippi House of Representatives: “Anybody 
here in the medical field knows how hard it is to get admitting privileges to a hospital.”); Mississippi lawmaker: 
Coat hanger abortions might come back. ‘But hey . . . ’, maddoWBloG (May 14, 2012), http://www.msnbc.
com/rachel-maddow-show/mississippi-lawmaker-coat-hanger-aborti [http://perma.cc/JZ9C-W3FG].
125 Monthly State Update: Major Developments In 2015, Guttmacher Inst., http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/updates/index.html#HospitalPrivileges [http://perma.cc/EUS8-ML7Y] (last updated Nov. 1, 2015). 
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III. Challenges to State Abortion Regulations
A. The Undue Burden Standard and the Right to Choose an Abortion
The undue burden standard revolutionized the Roe framework. Roe v. Wade created a 
trimester framework for evaluating the legality of abortion regulations.126 Before the end 
of the first trimester, the decision to choose an abortion must be left to the woman and her 
attending physician.127 The state may only enter the equation to limit the woman’s choice at 
the start of the second trimester, wherein the state may regulate abortion procedure in ways 
“reasonably related to maternal health.”128 Subsequent to viability, the state may regulate 
and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.129
Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court supplanted Roe’s analysis with a new, 
looser standard in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.130 Casey 
reaffirmed the existence of right to choose an abortion before fetal viability but expanded 
the constitutional boundaries of government power to regulate this right.131 
Casey forbids any state law that “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability” 
to decide to have an abortion.132 A regulation is invalid if it has “the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion” of a nonviable 
fetus.133 However, a state regulation that incidentally increases the difficulty or cost of an 
abortion is not facially invalid.134 This is because the means chosen by the State to protect 
126 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
127 Id. at 114.
128 Id. at 163. According to Roe, the reason is because medical fact at that time stated that until the end of the 
first trimester, mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.
129 Id. at 163–64. 
130 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also John A. Robertson, Abortion and 
Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 u. Pa. J. const. l. 327, 329 
(2011) (characterizing the undue burden standard as “looser” than the Roe trimester framework).
131 505 U.S. at 833–34, 874.
132 Id. at 874. 
133 Id. at 877. 
134 Id. at 874 (“The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, 
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its interest in unborn life “must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not 
hinder it.”135 Of the several state law provisions at issue in Casey, only one was found to 
impose an undue burden. Pennsylvania law at the time required that a married woman must 
certify that she has notified her husband of her decision to have an abortion, except in cases 
of medical emergency.136 
The Court invalidated the spousal notification requirement as an undue burden using 
an analytic that courts and scholars sometimes call the “large fraction” test.137 The Court 
examined spousal notification law not for its effect upon the total number of women 
seeking abortions in Pennsylvania, but those few for whom it would have an actual effect.138 
Although the group of women so-restricted constituted less than one percent of the women 
seeking abortions, the effect on these women was severe enough to create an undue burden 
in the eyes of the Supreme Court.139 The Court also examined the other provisions: a one-
parent consent requirement and judicial bypass provision,140 recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements,141 informed consent requirements,142 and twenty-four hour waiting period 
requirements.143 It announced that these provisions created no undue burden on the women 
affected.144
has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough 
to invalidate it.”).
135 Id. at 877.
136 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
137 Id. at 895. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1019 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cincinnati 
Women’s Servs. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 2006); Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on 
Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 colum. J. Gender & l. 111 (2008); Joshua 
C. Howard, Note, “No Set of Circumstances” v. “Large Fraction of Cases”: Debate Resolved—Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), 87 neB. l. rev. 759 (2009).
138 Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (“. . . § 3209’s real target is narrower even than the class of women seeking 
abortions identified by the State: it is married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands 
of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the notice requirement.”). 
139 Id. at 837–38. 
140 Id. at 899–900.
141 Id. at 900–01.
142 Id. at 884–87.
143 Id. at 885–97.
144 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884–901.
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More recently, Gonzales v. Carhart applied Casey to uphold the constitutionality 
of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.145 Gonzales concerned a federal statute 
that prohibited intact dilation and extraction abortions, an uncommon procedure that is 
performed in the second trimester. This case was remarkable for several reasons. First, the 
federal statute did not contain an exception for pregnancies that endangered a woman’s 
health. Second, it suggested that banning specific abortion methods could be justified in 
part by the government’s interest in protecting the woman from the emotional consequences 
of her abortion decision.146 The Court held that where a state acts on a rational basis, and 
where it does not impose an undue burden on women, it can regulate abortion by barring 
certain procedures and substituting others.147 Many commentators interpreted this decision 
to signal greater Supreme Court approval toward state-imposed abortion restrictions.148
Carhart also illustrated the malleability of Casey’s undue burden standard. The Court 
decided that because medical uncertainty existed over whether the Act’s prohibition of 
partial-birth abortions creates significant health risks, a sufficient basis existed for the 
Court to decide that the Act does not impose an undue burden.149 This move can be read as 
145 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124 (2007). 
146 Transcript, After Gonzales v. Carhart: The Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, PeW res. (June 14, 2007), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2007/06/14/after-gonzales-v-carhart-the-future-of-abortion-jurisprudence/ [http://
perma.cc/NB3R-K76D].
147  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.
148 See Katia Desrouleaux, Banning Partial-Birth Abortion at All Costs—Gonzales v. Carhart: Three 
Decades of Supreme Court Precedent “Down the Drain,” 35 s.u. l. rev. 543 (2008) (“[Carhart] predicts 
the beginning of a rapid erosion of the right to abortion, irrespective of health and safety considerations. 
An overturn of Roe could very well be the next item on the Supreme Court’s agenda.”); Martha K. Plante, 
“Protecting” Women’s Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s Equal Right 
to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 am. u. J. Gender soc. Pol’y & l. 387, 395, 399–401 (2008); 
see also Anthony V. Agudelo, Gonzales v. Carhart—the Supreme Court’s Recent Abortion Decision: What It 
Means Now and May Mean for the Tuture, 9 mass. Bar ass’n sectIon rev. (2009), http://www.massbar.org/
publications/section-review/2007/v9-n3/gonzales-v-carhart-%E2%80%93-the-supreme-court%E2%80%99s-
recent-abortion-decision-what-it-means-now-and-may-mean-for-the-future [http://perma.cc/37XC-N8EC]: 
Furthermore, the Court adopts the opposite view and says that state and federal legislatures 
have “wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific 
uncertainty.” . . . Now, with a victory in their pockets from the Gonzales case, pro-life 
advocates will likely press state legislators to draft laws that will revive “partial-birth 
abortion” laws and further narrow women’s abortion rights, and Gonzales will undoubtedly 
embolden state legislatures to craft further abortion restrictions.
149 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164. 
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a way of avoiding the large-fraction test—because the number of women actually affected 
by a ban on partial-dilation procedures is unknown, there was no basis to conclude that the 
Act creates an undue burden and the law was presumptively valid. As discussed in the next 
Section, lower court decisions also demonstrate the difficulty of applying the undue burden 
standard in a principled and consistent fashion.150 
B. Applying “Undue Burden” to Admitting-Privileges Laws 
Following Casey, pro-choice advocates have mounted challenges to the deluge of 
TRAP laws on the undue burden theory.151 A recent search revealed twenty-one federal 
decisions, interim orders, or motions that specifically address admitting privileges, with the 
majority published since 2013. While some cases have been mooted, like that of a North 
Dakota clinic that finally received admitting privileges from a South Dakota hospital within 
the required distance,152 the majority of these cases are ongoing, making clarification of the 
standard a vital and pressing concern. 
Courts grapple with applying the undue burden standard in individual cases.153 Part 
of the challenge of using “undue burden” is that success on the merits depends largely on 
the framing of the “large fraction” for which a burden is assessed, not necessarily on the 
degree of burden actually imposed on individual woman or her abortion provider. The 
denominator of that “large fraction” is endlessly malleable. Accordingly, Casey’s undue 
burden inquiry has provided at best inconsistent protection of women’s access to abortion. 
150 Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 
yale J.l. & femInIsm 317, 353 (2006) (finding through empirical study that in a significant number of cases, 
federal courts have repudiated or misapplied Casey protections, manipulating the undue burden standard to 
undermine Roe’s protections and requiring “unattainably high levels of proof of undue burden”). See also 
Jessica Mason Pieklo, For Too Many, Accessing Abortion Is Already an ‘Undue Burden,’ rh realIty check 
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/03/11/many-accessing-abortion-already-undue-burden 
[http://perma.cc/F9F4-E9ZT].
151 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 
2013); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van 
Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858 (W.D. Wis. 2013); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280 
(M.D. Ala. 2013). 
152 See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900 (D.N.D. 2013); MKB Management Corp et 
al. v. Burdick et al., ctr. for reProd. rts. (June 6, 2014), http://www.reproductiverights.org/case/mkb-
management-corp-et-al-v-burdick-et-al [http://perma.cc/4XA7-T9UW].
153 Wharton et al., supra note 150. See also Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) 
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 yale l.J. 1318, 1322, 1329 n.45 (2009) (“Casey is a sufficiently malleable 
standard that it can be applied to either uphold or invalidate nearly any law that a state is likely to pass.”).
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Separate cases filed in similar circumstances that involve formally similar statutes are 
often resolved quite differently based on irregular judicial determinations of what would 
constitute an “undue burden.”154
For example, in 2014 the Fifth Circuit differently decided two cases that both involved 
laws with substantially similar admitting-privileges provisions. The court held that a 
challenge to a Mississippi admitting-privileges law, which would have had the effect of 
closing the only clinic in the state, had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.155 
Yet the same court of appeals had four months earlier rejected a Texas admitting-privileges 
law challenge, finding it did not create an undue burden.156 The cogent difference in the 
later case, according to the Fifth Circuit, was whether the law would effectively shut down 
the only abortion clinic in the state and pose an undue burden as applied to the women 
of Mississippi.157 In Texas, while a burden would likely fall upon residents in a particular 
sector of twenty-four counties in the Rio Grande Valley, the court found this did not impose 
a burden on Texas residents generally.158
An example of the difficulty of “correctly” applying the undue burden test appears 
in the passionate dissent from the Fifth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in the prior 
case, involving Texas’s abortion regulations.159 Judge Dennis argued that the three-judge 
panel decision in Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott 
154 See infra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
155 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014).
156 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 
2014) (sustaining the admitting privileges requirement of H.B. 2 on the basis that it does not impose an undue 
burden on the vast majority of Texas women seeking abortions, and the burden that it imposes on women is less 
than the waiting-period provision upheld in Casey). 
157 Jackson Women’s Health, 760 F.3d at 457 (holding also that a state may not “lean on its sovereign 
neighbors to provide protection of its citizens’ federal constitutional rights”); see also id. at 461–62 (Garza, J., 
dissenting). In a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit distinguished its previous holding that a state may not 
offload its constitutional duties to provide protection of access to abortion by focusing on individual choice. 
The court reasoned that Texas regulations did not pose an undue burden in part because women in El Paso could 
and did “choose” to travel twelve miles over the border to New Mexico’s abortion facility instead of 550 miles 
to the nearest Texas facility. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 598 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 
F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015).
158 Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 598. 
159 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013), 
rehearing denied en banc, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott III) 
769 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2014).
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(Abbott II) incorrectly employed the Casey test by applying “what effectively amounts to a 
rational-basis test . . . under the guise of applying the undue burden standard.”160 Moreover, 
he argued that the court mishandled the “large fraction” test when assessing the effect of 
the admitting-privileges and medical-abortion provisions “by disregarding the effect of 
the law in light of the relevant context and circumstances faced by the women for whom 
the law is relevant (i.e., for whom it actually burdens).”161 Judge Dennis cited the district 
court’s findings that “approximately one in three women” in Texas seeking an abortion 
would be precluded from accessing an abortion, and that forty percent of women seeking 
abortions in Texas are at or below the federal poverty line, and thus are unable to travel 
the distances necessary to access abortions should the clinics in their area close.162 By 
contrast, the majority had held that since more than ninety percent of women seeking an 
abortion in Texas would be able to find a clinic within one hundred miles of their respective 
residences, no undue burden was created for a large fraction of the relevant cases.163 To 
restate, Dennis’s denominator was the women in the Rio Grande Valley; the majority’s 
denominator was Texas women generally. 
Application of the Casey standard is difficult not only because it requires a highly fact-
sensitive inquiry into the effect of an abortion regulation as applied, but also because of 
the often unacknowledged judgment involved in framing the “large fraction” for whom the 
burden will be assessed. For a poor, pregnant woman living in Texas’s Rio Grande Valley, 
the distinction drawn by the three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit between Mississippi 
and Texas is nearly meaningless. Even if she were able to come up with the money for 
the procedure, geography would pose a burden. The drive from the Rio Grande Valley 
to San Antonio, where the next closest clinic would be should the ambulatory surgical 
center requirement go into effect, is between 230 and 250 miles.164 The drive from Corinth, 
Mississippi, on the border between Mississippi and Tennessee, to Jackson, the locale of 
the only remaining clinic, is 239 miles. Yet that panel assessed the respective laws based 
on the entire population of Texas and Mississippi, finding Texas’s admitting-privileges law 
constitutional but Mississippi’s unconstitutional. 
 
160 Abbott III, 769 F.3d at 332.
161 Id. at 330, 335.
162 Id. at 361. 
163 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 598 (5th Cir. 2014).
164 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 303 (5th Cir. 2014).
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This analytic difficulty presages a circuit split. While some courts of appeal have 
sustained admitting-privileges requirements,165 at least one other circuit has indicated that 
admitting-privileges requirements constitute an undue burden.166 Under the factors relevant 
to an undue burden analysis, these decisions hinge largely on the factual context of each 
state and judicial discretion in framing the “large fraction.” Assuming that the state denies 
allegations of bad faith or an invalid purpose to burden abortion providers,167 laws such 
as admitting-privileges requirements might be better challenged in a way that targets the 
procedures and lack of safeguards involved in the process of obtaining admitting privileges. 
C. An Introduction to Private Delegation Challenges
Admitting-privileges laws take a standard form: shared public and private input in 
regulatory decision-making. Faced with resource constraints, governments often rely on 
private entities to achieve regulatory goals. Private participation in government decision-
making, implementation, and enforcement is so entrenched that the borders between public 
and private sectors are often blurred.168 
Distributing regulatory power to private entities creates benefits outside of easing 
government costs—state and federal governments can take advantage of private 
expertise and specialization. Federal and state agencies often rely on private parties to set 
standards, delegating power to a number of self-regulating bodies that set and implement 
165 Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envt’l Control, 317 F.3d 357, 363 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (finding a South Carolina regulation requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a 
local hospital to be “so obviously beneficial to patients”); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Cnty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 
F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989) (ruling that a Missouri statute requiring abortion providers to have admitting 
privileges “furthers important state health objectives”).
166 See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 922 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming lower 
court’s permanent injunction against a Wisconsin admitting-privileges law for imposing an undue burden).
167 Notably, in Mississippi’s case, the State waived any argument that the law would not close the last 
remaining abortion clinic. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014). See also 
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 423 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (“Because of its conclusion 
as to the effect of the Act, the Court need not consider the thorny question whether public statements from 
numerous State officials lauding the Act as a ban on abortion in Mississippi are alone sufficient to demonstrate 
unconstitutional purpose.”).
168 Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: “Dream or Nightmare?”, 68 soc. serv. 
rev. 33, 35 (1994); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 colum. l. rev. 1367 (2003) [hereinafter 
Metzger, Privatization].
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standards.169 They also rely on private parties to provide services, design policies, and 
implement regulatory structures.170 Frequently cited examples include Medicare and 
Medicaid Managed Care,171 private prisons,172 military contractors,173 and Standard Setting 
Organizations (SSOs) such as the New York Stock Exchange,174 among others. 
Accountability concerns grow from the increasing allocation of discretionary 
regulatory powers to private entities.175 Private entities often do not face the multiple 
layers of oversight to which public actors are subject.176 Private parties’ motivations also 
differ, such that ideology, profit, or related factors may dampen private responsiveness to 
community concerns. Private parties also lack the culture of public-mindedness that public 
agencies tend to foster.177 
Outside of the clear governance benefits, reliance on industry expertise is often justified 
by the argument that private parties are best equipped to self-regulate. Yet “self-regulation” 
is arguably a myth. The actual structure of “self-regulation” resembles either a group in 
an industry regulating other people in that industry, a group regulating their competitors, 
or a group regulating another, related group.178 When private parties regulate, they can 
control third parties’ access to government benefits and resources.179 Thus, judicial review 
 
169 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 n.y.u. l. rev. 543, 551 (2000).
170 Id.
171 Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1380.
172 Id. at 1380.
173 Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 n.c. l. rev. 397, 
441–46 (2006). 
174 Id. at 433. 
175 Freeman, supra note 169, at 574.
176 These include intra-agency oversight, public reaction through the use of the political process, and judicial 
review. 
177 See Freeman, supra note 169, at 550. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 173, at 468 (“When private contractors 
perform inherent government functions, they jeopardize core values of public law and weaken government’s 
capacity to do the common good.”).
178 Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust 
Challenges, 37 harv. J.l. & PuB. Pol’y 931, 934 (2014). 
179 Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1371.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law576 30.2
of private-public delegations can allay fears that use of private decision makers would 
disrupt democratic accountability.
Courts continue to express discomfort with private delegations,180 fearing that a 
delegation of a properly governmental power outside of the structures of government can 
and frequently does lead to arbitrary governance.181 Privatization of regulatory functions, 
because it involves delegation of power without ensuring the presence of the legally 
necessary nexus between the government and the private actor to bring the private actor 
under state action doctrine, often creates constitutional accountability problems.182 State 
action doctrine can curb government malfeasance; conversely, acts by purely private actors 
are generally beyond the reach of the Constitution.183 
With respect to admitting-privileges requirements, absent an effective standard of 
government review, hospitals may not be accountable to the interests of the privacy rights 
of individual women. If the hospital’s actions are not actionable in civil litigation and the 
government has not limited the hospital’s ability to act capriciously or arbitrarily in deciding 
to give or withhold effective licenses, the admitting-privilege law, and by extension the 
state, will have circumvented the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of individual due 
process rights. 
As explained in this Section, current doctrines of American constitutional law require 
“clear boundaries” to be placed on the exercise of discretion where governmental power 
has been delegated to a private, non-state actor.184 Courts have tackled the problem of 
improper delegation through two doctrines: non-delegation and due process. Frequently 
these two analyses become muddled. To distinguish the applicable due process doctrine, 
this Part will briefly describe non-delegation doctrine in both its state and federal forms. 
180 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (standardless delegation to churches of an effective 
veto on liquor licenses equivalent to traditional government liquor license violates the First Amendment by 
vesting traditional government authority in churches); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex. 1997). 
See also Note, Vagaries of Vagueness, Rethinking CFAA as A Problem of Private Delegation, 127 harv. l. rev. 
751, 763 (2013) [hereinafter Vagaries of Vagueness]. 
181 Vagaries of Vagueness, supra note 180, at 761–62.
182 Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1377.
183 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 colum. l. rev. 873, 886 (1987)
184 Planned Parenthood of Wis. Inc. v. Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d 956, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (citing United 
States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2013)).
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1. Delegation Doctrine
Courts sometimes resolve claims of improper delegation to private parties under non-
delegation doctrine. The conventional version of federal non-delegation doctrine arises 
from an interpretation of the Vesting Clause in Article I of the United States Constitution 
that theorizes that all legislative powers belong exclusively to Congress.185 Non-delegation 
doctrine forbids Congress from authorizing another branch of government to exercise 
lawmaking powers because proper lawmaking must pass through the bicameralism 
and presentment processes.186 However, broad delegations of legislative authority are 
constitutional so long as Congress supplies an “intelligible principle” that sets bounds on 
the person or body authorized.187 
While the typical non-delegation doctrine is a doctrine of public governance rooted in 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers, some scholars identify a “cousin,”188 
private non-delegation doctrine, which precludes overbroad Congressional grants of power 
to private parties.189 In addition to federal non-delegation doctrine, various state courts 
185 Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Non-delegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 
colum. l. rev. 2097, 2168 (2004). For the courts’ interpretation, see, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“[The] text of [Article I, section 1] permits no delegation of [legislative] powers.”); 
Crain v. First Nat’l Bank of Or., Portland, 324 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1963) (reasoning that, under Article I, 
section 1, “Congress cannot delegate to private corporations or anyone else the power to enact laws”).
186 Merrill, supra note 185, at 2126.
187 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
188 See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) (AAR); Froomkin, infra 
note 213, at 28 n.33.
189 David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 n.y.u. l. rev. 437, 473–74 (2011). Academic controversy 
persists over whether the private-public distinction in non-delegation doctrine is meaningful. Some scholars 
argue that the private-public distinction is unnecessary for federal non-delegation cases, because the significant 
issue is not the party to whom the legislature has given power, but whether the legislature has given up 
power without sufficient standards. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting 
Delegations to Private Parties, 65 u. mIamI l. rev. 507, 511 (2011); Volokh, supra note, 178 at 958, 960. 
Others argue that non-delegation doctrine is “more muscular” as applied to private parties, because the exercise 
of private power entails fewer safeguards. Horton, supra, at 472–73. The need for more protections against 
abuses of power and undemocratic governance makes the “private” non-delegation doctrine distinction useful, 
because the stakes are higher. Id. at 472–73. For one account of private delegation, see Horton’s argument that 
the private non-delegation doctrine does not rely on the “intelligible principle” test, but on a three-factor inquiry 
examining whether the delegation (1) authorizes private actors to make law in a non-neutral, nontransparent 
way, (2) provides adequate representation to affected parties through the private lawmaking process, and 
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have created their own private delegation analyses.
Some of these state private non-delegation analyses are stricter than the “intelligible 
principle” federal standard.190 Many of these states are those in which reproductive rights 
litigation is underway, including Texas, Florida, Arizona, and Oklahoma.191 Some of these 
states clearly ground their doctrines in separation of powers concerns; others specifically 
impose limits on delegations to private parties.192
Even the Supreme Court, however, has struck down delegations with reference to the 
private-public nature of the delegation.193 In Carter v. Carter Coal, the Court famously 
held the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act had made an arbitrary delegation that violated 
both Article I of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause.194 Congress had empowered 
a majority of miners and large coal producers in the coal districts to prescribe hours, 
wages, and prices within their respective districts. Any who did not comply were subject 
to an excise tax. The Court invalidated the law as being “legislative delegation in its most 
obnoxious form.”195 Carter Coal has been taken as the basis for private non-delegation 
doctrine, though some controversy over the constitutional basis of this decision persists.196 
(3) whether the state retains control over the private delegate. Horton’s test, however, belies the fact that these 
factors sound in due process, not separation of powers.
190 See, e.g., Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997). For an 
exposition of current state non-delegation doctrines, see Volokh, supra note 178, at 961–70. 
191 Volokh, supra note 178, at 961–70.
192 These states are Iowa, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Volokh, supra note 178, at 961–70.
193 See also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (“Could trade or 
industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for [enacting laws for the rehabilitation and 
expansion of their trade and industries] because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of 
their enterprises? . . . The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and 
is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”); Volokh, supra note 178, 
at 958 n.137.
194 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). In response to Carter Coal, Louis Jaffe argues that 
private delegation analysis really asks whether the delegation is reasonable within the limits of due process; 
he accurately predicted that due process would become the face of delegation doctrine that survives federally. 
See Louis L. Jaffe, Lawmaking by Private Groups, 51 harv. l. rev. 201, 248 (1937). Accord Volokh, supra 
note 178, at 979.
195 Carter, 298 U.S at 311.
196 Discussed infra I.B. 
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Subsequent private delegation challenges floundered in Currin v. Wallace197 and 
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,198 where the Court found no impermissible 
delegation of legislative power to private actors. In Currin, the Court sustained a regulatory 
scheme where the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to promulgate binding uniform 
tobacco standards if two-thirds of the growers in an area voted in favor of such regulation.199 
Here the substantive content of the regulations was determined by public officials; private 
individuals held a trigger, like an on-off switch, to implement the regulations.200 In Adkins, 
the constitutionality of a second Bituminous Coal Act was upheld where local coal 
producers may set rules governing the sale of coal, subject to the approval of a government 
agency. The key to a delegation’s viability is whether the Government retains control over 
privately created regulations.
2. The Relevance of Delegation Doctrine  
Commentators and even courts have sometimes labeled a due-process-based analysis 
by the name of non-delegation doctrine.201 For the purposes of due process analysis, 
whether non-delegation doctrine is violated depends not on the private or public nature 
of the delegatee, but on the extent and nature of the delegation.202 Federal law considers 
the constitutionality of TRAP laws only by the rubric of whether they comply with the 
Due Process Clause. The federal non-delegation doctrine, even applying to private parties, 
does not extend to state legislation, unlike due process, which binds the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Yet non-delegation is important to explain, because it persists 
both as a canon of interpretation, and possibly in its state law formulations as a dark horse 
approach to attacking admitting-privileges laws.
Received wisdom declares that federal non-delegation doctrine is dead.203 The 
Supreme Court has deployed it only twice to strike down a federal statute, both times 
197 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
198 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 387–88 (1940).
199 Currin, 306 U.S. at 19.
200 See Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1399–1400; Volokh, supra note 178, at 959.
201 Volokh, supra note 178, at 933. 
202 Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1400. 
203 Freeman, supra note 169, at 591 (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine shows no credible signs of coming back 
to life.”).
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during the New Deal era.204 Any doubt of non-delegation doctrine’s irrelevance in the 
modern administrative state was purportedly dispelled with Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations,205 in which the Supreme Court rejected an improper delegation argument, 
reiterating that properly delegated powers under the Clean Air Act requires only that an 
intelligible principle exists, and the scope of discretion provided to the Environmental 
Protection Agency remained within the outer limits of non-delegation precedents.206 The 
Court has had other opportunities to resurrect non-delegation as grounds of decision, but 
demurred.207 
Yet non-delegation doctrine resurfaces at the Supreme Court level in ways other than 
as grounds of decision. Justice Blackmun has noted that non-delegation doctrine lives on 
as a principle of statutory interpretation akin to constitutional avoidance.208 Moreover, 
the lower courts still cite the doctrine today. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
invalidated a law on non-delegation grounds—let alone private non-delegation grounds— 
 
 
204 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). 
205 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical 
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. 
Accordingly, this Court has deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient’ if Congress clearly delineates the general 
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”). The Court 
declined to consider non-delegation doctrine as its grounds of decision in Clinton v. City of New York. Clinton 
v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
206 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
207 See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S 417; Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). In 
AAR, the D.C. Circuit decision below, Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), invalidated a regulatory scheme under which Amtrak, a private corporation heavily subsidized by the 
Government and chartered by federal law, shared joint authority with the Federal Railroad Administration to 
determine metrics and standards for rail companies. The Supreme Court reversed the case on the grounds that 
Amtrak was in fact a government entity for the purposes of the federal law, mooting the private delegation 
question, in March 2015. See AAR, 135 S. Ct. at 1225.
208 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our application of the non-
delegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, 
to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that otherwise might be thought unconstitutional.”). See 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Non-delegation Canons, 67 u. chI. l. rev. 315–16 (2000) (non-delegation lives on in 
canons of construction, susceptible to principled judicial application); John F. Manning, The Non-delegation 
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 suP. ct. rev. 223.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 58130.2
since Carter Coal, lower federal courts and state courts continue to deploy private non-
delegation doctrine in various forms.209 
3. Due Process Principles and Private Decision Makers
Federal court challenges to state law-based delegations typically sound in due process. 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment binds the states, due process protections apply where 
a private actor has “taken the decisive step to cause the harm” to the injured party, and a 
sufficient nexus exists between the decision and the state, such that the action can fairly be 
characterized as the act of the state itself.210 Hints of a possible due process problem arise 
where there is both delegation of power and pecuniary interest.211
Due process analysis and non-delegation doctrines differ at the point where the 
unconstitutional action is identified. Non-delegation doctrine points to a law’s unconstrained 
delegation of power, while due process accounts for the lack of notice, an impartial 
adjudicator, and an opportunity to be heard—all of which can be instituted with appropriate 
legislative constraints. The distinction makes a difference when we examine state laws 
and regulations: the due process analysis binds state laws and regulations, while a federal 
separation of powers analysis cannot, without incorporation into state law, independently 
bind states.212
To invalidate state laws, the lower courts consider whether a delegation deprives parties 
of a protected property interest.213 Commentators surveying these decisions have identified 
various factors called private delegation by lower courts, including whether affected 
parties are adequately represented; whether the state retains control over the authorized 
private decision maker, and whether the private actors are authorized to make law in a non-
209 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448 (2d Cir. 1991); see also infra notes 
277–285 and accompanying text. See generally Volokh, supra note 178, at 963. 
210 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
211 Volokh, supra note 178, at 940–41.
212 Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1437.
213 Louis Jaffe has identified the importance of a due process analysis in assessing state regulations. Jaffe, 
supra note 194, at 204. See also A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route 
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 duke l.J. 17 (2000) (suggesting that the doctrine of forbidding 
delegation of public powers to private groups is rooted in the Due Process Clause’s prohibition against self-
interested regulations); Verkuil, supra note 173, at 420.
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neutral, non-transparent way214—of a kind with traditional due process concerns underlying 
constitutional law.215 
As previously mentioned, Carter Coal’s decision sounds in due process—that allowing 
private industry instead of a presumptively disinterested official body to set standards 
amounts to depriving parties of protected rights and is “so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly 
a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”216 Lack 
of a disinterested decision maker and other government safeguards over the exercise of 
private power make a delegation suspect. This logic controls in Sunshine Anthracite Coal 
Co. v. Adkins, where the Supreme Court later upheld an amended Bituminous Coal Act 
against a private non-delegation challenge.217 The new version of the Act again allowed 
private coal boards to set rules governing the sale of coal, which were subject to oversight 
by the National Bituminous Coal Commission.
However, straightforward due process challenges to the actions of a private hospital will 
usually meet the barrier of the state action doctrine. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
bind only government actors. State action doctrine requires first, that the challenged 
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of a state-created right or privilege or by a 
rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible, and 
second, that the party charged with the deprivation may “fairly be said to be a state actor.”218 
Thus, a straightforward due process challenge does not reach the actions of private parties 
who are not sufficiently supervised by government decision makers. Perversely, the nexus 
requirement of state action doctrine creates incentives for governments to delegate more 
unguided powers to private actors to avoid liability.219 A facial challenge may be levied 
more easily where a delegation is standardless and allows private actors to regulate their 
peers capriciously.220 In Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, the Supreme 
Court found a violation of due process where property owners “uncontrolled by any 
214 See Horton, supra note 189.
215 At least one court has suggested that whether a delegation is invalid under non-delegation or due process 
is purely academic. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
216 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S 238, 311 (1936).
217 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.. 381, 398 (1940).
218 Metzger, Privatization, supra note 168, at 1412.
219 Id. at 1371.
220 Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
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standard” may exercise coercive power over other property owners through abstaining or 
dissenting “for selfish reasons or arbitrarily.”221 The advantage of a due process delegation 
challenge is that decisions at the Supreme Court bind both state and lower federal courts. 
Federal non-delegation doctrine does not have binding effect on state legislation, however; 
it can provide no more than persuasive power. The disadvantage of improper delegation 
challenges is that finding facial violations of due process on the basis of private third-party 
veto power are generally disfavored.222 
Historically, improper delegation to private parties violating the Due Process Clause 
has been found where a pecuniary bias affects the ability of the private party to be a neutral 
decision maker.223 This principle was articulated in Eubank v. City of Richmond, where the 
Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance as violating due process where some property 
owners can “virtually control and dispose of the property rights of others” and may do so 
“solely for their own interest, or capriciously.”224 A due process challenge targeting the 
regulation at issue under the Due Process Clause evaluates the extent of coercive power 
that the government has delegated to private parties.225 For the purposes of the following 
analysis, this due-process-based reasoning will be termed “improper delegation.”
IV. Constitutional Challenges and State Delegation Strategies
A. Past Due Process Challenges to Admitting-Privileges Requirements
Many cases challenging admitting-privileges laws for creating an “undue burden” 
have also advanced improper delegation challenges.226 In the early days of admitting-
privileges litigation, district courts were receptive to this claim. In Michigan, a regulation 
221 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928).
222 But see Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 609 (6th Cir. 2006) (laying out the due 
process challenge to a private delegation and finding the admitting privileges provision constitutional because 
the government’s discretionary waiver meant local hospitals do not necessarily hold final say).
223 Volokh, supra note 178, at 941.
224 Eubank, 226 U.S. at 143. Eubank does not quite apply here, because Eubank has been interpreted as 
creating a due process problem where private parties can regulate an unregulated status quo and affect other 
private rights. Volokh, supra note 178, at 942.
225 See generally David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind. l.J. 647, 662, 
672–95 (1986).
226 Administrative challenges are not a new idea. See Gillian Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative 
Regulation, 36 emory l.J. 865, 869 (2007). 
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requiring abortion clinics to secure a written transfer agreement with a physician who 
had hospital staff privileges was struck down because the law delegated an “unguided” 
licensing function to a private entity “whose self-interest could color its decision to assist 
licensure of a competitor.”227 The district court stated in no uncertain terms: “The power 
to prohibit licensure may not constitutionally be placed in the hands of hospitals. Such an 
impermissible delegation without standards or safeguards to protect against unfairness, 
arbitrariness or favoritism is void for lack of due process.”228 
More recently, courts have shown ambivalence toward similar challenges, tending to 
uphold the challenged laws on the basis that some standard or safeguard implicitly exists 
in the admitting-privileges scheme.229 The case law reveals, however, that at least some 
circuits continue to recognize that delegation of an unguided power to issue an effective 
veto of a license presents a due process problem. 
1. Decisions that Recognize a Due Process Problem
Some circuits agree that a due process problem results from giving hospitals unfettered 
discretion. The most thorough discussion comes from the Sixth Circuit in Women’s Medical 
Professional Corporation v. Baird. Baird held that Ohio’s written transfer agreement 
requirement did not allow hospitals to “essentially grant” a license to an abortion clinic 
because the regulatory scheme permits a government veto.230 The court reasoned that, 
unlike Roberge,231 where a minority of landowners could, “uncontrolled by any standard or 
rule” propounded by the government, affect the rights of their fellows,232 Ohio’s regulatory 
scheme grants the Director of the Ohio Department of Health the ability to waive the 
written transfer agreement requirement. Because area hospitals do not necessarily have 
227 Birth Control Ctrs., Inc. v. Reizen, 508 F. Supp. 1366, 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 743 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Hallmark Clinic v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Human Res., 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (holding unconstitutional a written transfer agreement 
requirement that “placed no limits on the hospital’s decision to grant or withhold a transfer agreement”).
228 Reizen, 508 F. Supp at 1375.
229 See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 556 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no evidence to 
sustain facial challenge to delegation, which requires showing that there are no circumstances under which the 
delegation could be applied constitutionally).
230 Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 609 (6th Cir. 2006).
231 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
232 Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121–22. 
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the final say over a provider’s ability to practice, the court found that there was no due 
process problem.233 The Sixth Circuit’s decision reversed the district court’s holding that 
the written transfer agreement is unconstitutional as applied to the Dayton clinic because 
of impermissible delegation, but did not question the applicability of the due process 
challenge to the delegation. 
In upholding Ohio’s scheme, the Sixth Circuit looked to a similar Fourth Circuit 
decision, Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Commissioner, South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control.234 In Greenville Women’s Clinic, the state law in dispute 
required doctors to maintain admitting privileges with a hospital and clinics to maintain 
referral arrangements with a doctor who has admitting privileges at a local hospital and 
has agreed to be available during “operating-hours.”235 The Fourth Circuit concluded that 
the possibility that South Carolina’s admitting privileges requirement would amount to 
a third-party veto of an abortion clinic’s license is “so remote that, on a facial challenge, 
we cannot conclude that the statute denies the abortion clinics due process.”236 The court 
emphasized that the facial claim failed because no evidence existed to rebut the regulation’s 
constitutionality.237 The facts were fatal in Greenville Women’s Clinic: the appellant clinic 
and doctor had already obtained admitting privileges at local hospitals or arrangements 
with physicians who had such privileges, in accordance with South Carolina law.238 A facial 
challenge could not be sustained without proof that “no set of circumstances” existed under 
which the Act would be valid, a fact made more unlikely by the existence of a waiver 
provision.239 
In a footnote, the Sixth Circuit also emphasized that the Fourth Circuit had considered 
the due process question. South Carolina case law, the Fourth Circuit pointed out, 
required that the state’s “public hospitals not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, capriciously, 
233 Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 438 F.3d at 610.
234 Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envt’l Control, 317 F.3d 357, 357 (4th 
Cir. 2002).
235 Id. at 362.
236 Id. at 362–63.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 362.
239 Id. at 362–63.
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or discriminatorily in granting or denying admitting privileges.”240 The Sixth Circuit did 
not ultimately find for the clinic in Women’s Medical Professional Corporation because 
the government’s denial of the waiver request was unreviewable. Ohio law granted the 
Commissioner absolute discretion in deciding whether to approve a waiver request. Thus, 
the clinic had no property interest in the waiver and no right to due process before the 
waiver was denied.241 
2. Decisions Dismissing Due Process Challenges By Analogy to Licenses
Other Courts of Appeals have glossed over the due process problem with a glib 
analogy to medical licensing schemes. The Eighth Circuit found in Women’s Health Center 
of West County, Inc. v. Webster that Missouri’s requirement that physicians have surgical 
privileges at local hospitals was no more of a threat to their due process rights than the 
requirement that abortion providers also be licensed physicians.242 They distinguished 
contrary precedent because Missouri regulated “the qualifications of persons who perform 
abortions rather than standards for licensure of abortion clinics.”243 They buttressed their 
argument by referring to Connecticut v. Menillo, in which the Supreme Court concluded 
that states may require persons performing abortions to be licensed physicians, to ensure 
that an abortion is “as safe for the woman as normal childbirth at term.”244 
At least one other circuit picked up this analogy. In 2014, the Fifth Circuit quoted 
Webster to reject the unlawful delegation claim against Texas S.B. 2.245 Instead of engaging 
with the due process question, the Fifth Circuit woodenly recited Webster’s analogy 
comparing admitting-privileges requirements to board licensure requirements.246
240 Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 610 n.9 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Greenville Women’s 
Clinic, 317 F.3d at 362).
241 Baird, 438 F.3d at 615.
242 Women’s Health Ctr of W. Cnty, Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989).
243 Id. at 1382. 
244 Id. (quoting Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975)). 
245 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 2014).
246 Id. 
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3. State Licensing Schemes 
Webster’s analogy, however, is unsound. While state licensing boards must abide by 
procedural rules that deter arbitrary infringements of a physician’s rights, no similar legal 
mandate governs a hospital’s admitting-privileges approval process. Each state defines the 
qualifications of those permitted to practice medicine, frequently by appointing boards of 
medical professionals.247 State medical boards follow procedural rules and submit to state 
regulatory oversight of their decisions, but are generally given deference in their evaluations 
of a candidate’s credentials.248 Greater due process protections cover an already licensed 
physician if a state board decides to suspend, revoke, or not renew her license, the scope 
of which are determined by each state’s administrative procedure acts.249 Reproductive 
rights case law demonstrates that although no physician or clinic has a property interest in 
a license as a first-time applicant, physicians and clinics already in practice have a property 
interest in the continued operation of their businesses.250 
Conversely, because hospitals are generally not state actors, the protections of a 
state administrative procedure act and constitutional constraints do not apply in judging 
individual admitting-privileges applications. Hospitals may be required by state law to 
follow the hospital’s own procedural rules, as set forth in their bylaws.251 Occasionally, state 
regulation determines the general process that a hospital’s governing body must follow in 
making determinations about admitting privileges.252 It is only in the latter scenario that the 
state administrative procedure acts in determine which violations are actionable. 
Moreover, transparency issues arise in the admitting-privileges context. Unlike state 
licensing boards, which are policed by state regulation and whose actions are sometimes 
subject to disclosure, hospital review processes are not similarly subject to state disclosure 
regulations. Federal law does not require disclosure of the record in each hospital’s 
 
247 Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review 
and Guide For Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care 
Organizations, 8 annals health l. 201, 217–19 (1999). 
248 Id. at 218–19. 
249 Id.
250 See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006).
251 Discussed infra Part IV.C.1. 
252 See infra Part IV.C.1 for examples. 
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admitting-privileges decision, while state laws can often protect these records from 
disclosure.253 
Webster’s analogy between state licensing and private admitting-privileges decisions 
is also overhasty; in areas other than abortion, hospitals can be subject to antitrust suit for 
effectively pushing a physician out of business.254 The danger of anticompetitive behavior 
is particularly acute where the hospital may have non-economic interests competing with 
impartial evaluation of a physician’s application. For example, some hospitals are explicitly 
religious, which creates an additional, First Amendment hurdle for abortion providers to 
clear. Even when the institution is not religious, a hospital’s review board must struggle 
with religious, moral, and economic concerns in associating with a doctor who provides 
abortions, concerns not triggered by a state board’s mere grant or renewal of this doctor’s 
license. This due process problem is exacerbated where state law lacks any standards, 
principles, or mechanisms protecting against private arbitrariness or favoritism.255  
For the analogy between hospitals and state licensing boards to be valid, similar due 
process protections must inhere in the hospitals’ decision making. First, pecuniary interest 
in the proceedings can make a party an improper decision maker with respect to licenses.256 
A state board biased by “prejudgment and pecuniary interest” cannot constitutionally 
revoke a doctor’s license.257 While traditionally framed in an antitrust light, this prohibition 
can also include hospitals motivated by fear of losing donors and patients due to publicity 
around granting privileges to an abortion provider. Under this theory, a law that empowers a 
hospital biased by financial interest or other prejudgment to effectively revoke a previously 
valid license is constitutionally suspect. 
Otherwise, the state could exploit the private prejudice of hospitals to evade the 
application of the state action doctrine, effectively reducing women’s access to abortion 
through the private acts that fall outside the reach of state action doctrine. For example, 
in the Currier case, not only did a state legislator boast to constituents about the law, 
emphasizing the difficulty of obtaining admitting privileges, state counsel also did not 
contest that Mississippi’s Attorney General aimed to shut down the state’s sole licensed 
253 See supra note 83. 
254 See supra note 82.
255 Group Health Ins. of N.J. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 447 (1963).
256 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523–24 (1927); see generally Volokh, supra note 178.
257 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973). 
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clinic.258 All seven hospitals in the area had in fact refused to grant doctors admitting 
privileges. Responses to the clinic’s request included: “[t]he nature of your proposed 
medical practice is inconsistent with this Hospital’s policies and practices as concerns 
abortion and, in particular, elective abortion,” and “[t]he nature of your proposed medical 
practice would lead to both an internal and external disruption of the Hospital’s function 
and business within this community.”259 The State subsequently denied the clinic’s request 
for a waiver.260 
B. The Future of Improper Delegation Challenges
More recently, with the spate of new admitting-privileges laws being passed, some 
district courts have evinced openness to challenges on the basis of a due process violation 
amounting to improper delegation. In Mississippi, plaintiffs expressly reserved the claim 
of improper delegation of lawmaking authority, which the court suggested could be a valid 
argument.261 In Alabama, the improper delegation claim was dismissed without prejudice 
because neither party had presented a regulation promulgated to enforce Alabama’s 
admitting-privileges requirement.262 
Just last year, the district court in Wisconsin found an unconstitutional delegation where 
the state law implements a requirement from hospitals that doctors applying for admitting 
privileges have a record of “inpatient care.”263 Such a requirement served “no legitimate 
state interest” and, in the absence of a statutory mechanism by which the government 
can waive the admitting privileges requirements, cannot constitutionally be imposed on 
abortion providers.264 The success on the merits in Wisconsin demonstrates that improper 
delegation remains an open, if relatively underused, avenue to pose constitutional challenge 
against admitting-privileges laws.
258 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 423 (S.D. Miss. 2013).
259 Id. at 450 n.3.
260 Id. at 450–51.
261 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 n.2 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (granting 
preliminary injunction).
262 Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1278–79 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
263 Planned Parenthood of Wis. Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 996–97 (W.D. Wis. 2015).
264 Id.
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C. Other Strategies
1. State Administrative Processes 
Straightforward state administrative challenges also exist to challenge admitting-
privileges laws.265 Most state codes contain administrative processes by which an regulated 
party can contest enforcement or penalty actions brought by the State.266 However, few 
states provide preemptory administrative methods to prevent a medical license revocation 
due to inability to obtain admitting-privileges. 
In this Section, I give brief samples of different types of state administrative processes, 
as a fifty-state survey is beyond the scope of this Note. Alabama regulations require that a 
hospital’s bylaws include criteria for determining the privileges to be granted to individual 
physicians and a procedure for applying the criteria to individuals requesting privileges, 
but does not provide for external review of either the criteria or procedure.267 Tennessee 
regulations require hospital bylaws to contain procedures governing the grant, revocation, 
suspension, and renewal of medical staff privileges, including an appeal process.268 
Outside of these bylaw procedures, no state process or supervision is mandated during the 
physician’s admitting-privilege application proceedings.
Although Texas regulations lack an administrative waiver of the admitting-privileges 
requirement,269 the governing bodies of hospitals must ensure that each physician is 
afforded procedural due process in his or her application for medical staff privileges by 
state regulation.270 Hospitals that fail to take the required action on a completed application 
can be brought to mediation by the affected physician as provided for under Texas’ Civil 
265 Advocates increasingly turn to administrative complaints in recent years. In the absence of judicial 
review (whether due to lack of standing, a viable cause of action, or other barriers), administrative complaints 
have increasingly been used either as direct enforcement strategy leading to voluntary compliance agreements, 
or as a strategic adjunct to community outreach and grassroots campaigning. 
266 See, e.g., mIss. code ann. § 41-75-13 (West 2014); arIz. admIn. code. §§ 36-431.01, 36-427, 36-430 
(West 2014); 25 tex. admIn. code § 139.53 (West 2014). 
267 See, e.g., ala. admIn. code r. 420-5-7-.09 (West 2015).
268 tenn. comP. r. & reGs. 1200-08-01-.06(2)(b), (2)(d) (West 2014). 
269 25 tex. admIn code § 139.53 (2014).
270 25 tex. admIn code § 133.41(f)(4)(F)(i) (2014). 
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Practice and Remedies Code § 154.052, and within a reasonable period of time.271 However, 
no cause of action exists against the hospital other than to require the hospital to participate 
in mediation.272 
Ohio, one of the few states providing pre-enforcement remedies, empowered the director 
of the state health department to grant a variance or waiver from any building or safety 
requirement established by the code that governed abortion facilities and physicians.273 The 
waiver process provided a (theoretical) bypass for providers to practice despite admitting-
privileges denials. 
In Mississippi, the state is not directly authorized by code to grant waivers of the 
license requirement.274 The Mississippi law requires that doctors have admitting privileges 
not only to operate currently open clinics but upon an application for a clinic license. 275 
Licenses can be suspended after notice and a hearing where the agency finds a substantial 
failure to comply with abortion and ambulatory surgical center requirements; suspensions 
and other adverse decisions may be judicially challenged.276 Under state law, a Mississippi 
hospital’s decision to grant staff privileges is subject only to review of whether the hospital 
had followed its own bylaw requirements of due process.277 
The fact that few states provide administrative methods to bring pre-enforcement 
challenges to a hospital’s decision makes it difficult to challenge area hospitals’ denial 
of staff privileges without voluntarily violating the state regulation. This can be a huge 
disincentive to physicians, whose medical licenses are at risk when they violate state 
regulations. 
271 § 133.41(f)(4)(F)(i)(VIII). 
272 § 133.41(f)(4)(F)(i)(II).
273 ohIo admIn. code 3701-83-14 (West 2015). 
274 See mIss. code ann. § 41-75-5 (2014). The district court also noted that Mississippi’s regulation does 
not allow waivers. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 n.2 (S.D. Miss. 2013). 
275 mIss. code ann. § 41-75-1 (2014).
276 mIss. code ann. § 41-75-11 (2014). The applicant is free to appeal a denial, revocation, or suspension of 
a license to the chancery court in the county. Id.; mIss code ann. § 41-75-23 (2014). 
277 Wong v. Garden Park Cmty Hosp., Inc., 565 So.2d 550 (Miss. 1990). See also mIss. code ann. § 73-25-
93 (2014). 
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2. Litigation Under State Non-Delegation Doctrines
More unconventionally, an improper delegation could be attacked under the framework 
of each state’s private delegation doctrines.278 Some states have more detailed private 
delegation analysis that may give greater protections. Texas, for example, requires that 
courts more closely examine private delegations than public delegations.279 It instituted 
an eight-factor test. First, the court will consider whether the private delegate’s actions 
are subject to meaningful review by a state agency or other branch of state government.280 
Second, it weighs whether the persons affected by the private delegate’s actions are 
adequately represented in the decision-making process.281 Third, it considers whether the 
private delegate’s power is limited to making rules, or whether the delegate also applies 
the law to particular individuals.282 Fourth, it assesses whether the private delegate has a 
pecuniary or other personal interest that may conflict with his or her public function.283 
Fifth, it examines whether the private delegate is empowered to define criminal acts or 
impose criminal sanctions.284 Sixth, it accounts for whether the delegation is narrow in 
duration, extent, and subject matter.285 Seventh, it examines whether the private delegate 
possesses special qualifications or training for the task delegated to it.286 Lastly, it looks to 
whether the legislature has provided sufficient standards to guide the private delegate in 
his or her work.287 
Theoretically, an application of these eight factors could weigh very strongly against a 
state law granting an effective license to private hospitals. Although hospitals have greater 
expertise (the seventh factor), they also have pecuniary and other ethical or personal interests 
that may conflict with the function of carefully assessing a physician (fourth factor). There 
278 See supra Part II.1.
279 Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex. 1997).





285 Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex. 1997)
286 Id.
287 Id.
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is no indication that these physicians have representatives in the decision-making process 
either (second factor), and the delegation is arguably lengthy in duration, as the power to 
make an admitting-privileges decision has lasting impacts beyond the few months which 
it takes to come to a decision (sixth factor). Furthermore, there is little indication that the 
legislature had given hospitals any guidance (eighth factor).
This application of Texas’s private delegation doctrine is, of course, purely theoretical 
and necessarily cursory. This strategy has inevitable downsides: if the claim is brought in 
state courts, state judges and juries may be no more inclined to mitigate the effects of state 
regulation than the government. 
Yet case law reveals that some state courts are open to protecting the interests of 
abortion providers and women seeking abortion. In Oklahoma, the state supreme court 
unanimously voted to enjoin two laws that were set to take effect in November 2014—one 
of which required a physician with admitting privileges at a local hospital to be present 
during abortions.288 In that case, a doctor had testified at trial that he performs more than 
forty percent of the abortions in the state, that he had been unable to obtain admitting 
privileges in hospitals near his clinic, and that enforcement of the admitting privileges law 
would cause him to shut down his practice.289 Likewise, Tennessee’s recent constitutional 
amendment was a response to a Tennessee Supreme Court case giving greater substantive 
due process protections to abortion in that state than federal law would have provided.290 
3. Church Amendments, Federal Administrative Advocacy,291 and Qui 
Tam Suits 
Under the Church Amendments, a federally-funded hospital cannot deny an otherwise 
qualified applicant admitting privileges based on the applicant’s status as an abortion 




290 See supra notes 48–49.
291 For a discussion of advocacy through administrative processes at the federal level, see Jessica Rubin-
Wills, Language Access Advocacy After Sandoval: A Case Study of Administrative Enforcement Outside the 
Shadow of Judicial Review, 36 n.y.u. rev. l. & soc. chanGe 465 (2012). For a thorough account of the 
multifaceted work of law reform through administrative mechanisms, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering 
That Has No Name: Title VI and the Meaning of Private Enforcement, 66 stan. l. rev. 1293, 1311–31 (2014). 
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provider.292 Yet, courts consistently refuse to imply a right of action to enforce the Church 
Amendments.293 Instead, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has 
previously enforced the Amendments through investigations and voluntary compliance 
orders. So far, available data on Church Amendment enforcement shows that the Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) has resolved a case surrounding the conscience rights of two applicants 
to Vanderbilt University’s nurse residency program.294 No investigation or voluntary 
compliance agreement involving admitting-privileges denials has been publicized. 
Theoretically, the OCR may investigate a hospital’s denial of admitting privileges on the 
basis of abortion provision. The investigation could lead to a compliance agreement going 
forward.
Admittedly, reliance on HHS-conducted investigations is not ideal. Limited government 
resources, the difficulty of proving improper motives, and internal politics are a few of a 
litany of reasons why the OCR might not pursue a particular case of admitting-privileges 
denial. Plus, the temporary nature of pregnancy and the urgency that inheres in abortion 
services can make the lengthy administrative complaint process unsuitable as a primary 
method of securing women’s rights of access to abortion. 
On the other hand, HHS is a major policy maker in the health care landscape, through 
both its released guidance and more informal methods by which it pushes public health 
issues.295 Legal advocacy for agency action can supplement more pressing litigation 
addressed toward admitting-privileges laws. Advocating for developed guidance around an 
aspect of the Church Amendments could become a political fuse igniting counter-advocacy 
on the part of pro-life organizations to more rigidly promote the conscience protections that 
they embody. However, the piecemeal reproductive rights struggle—as litigation is won or 
292 Akbar Ahmed, Hospitals Can’t Deny Admitting Privileges to Abortion Doctors, AG says, J. sentInel 
(Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsin-attorney-general-says-hospitals-cant-
deny-admitting-privileges-to-abortion-doctors-b997046-218608951.html [http://perma.cc/VBC3-637A]. 
293 See Cenzon-Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 
15, 2010), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010); Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 
1582454 (C.D. Ill. Jun. 6, 2006). The lack of a private right of action also carries the benefit of foreclosing time- 
and resource-consuming conscience-based suits. See generally Nathaniel James, The Church Amendment: In 
Search of Enforcement, 68 Wash. & lee l. rev. 717 (2011). 
294 Powerpoint, Enforcement of the Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, u.s. 
deP’t health & human servs, http://akatest3-ion-www.hhs.gov.edgekey-staging.net/sites/default/files/ocr/
civilrights/provider_conscience_ppt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UXC-27H4].
295 Among its current publications are Informed Consent Requirements from OHCP and model documents 
such as Model Notices of Privacy Practices. 
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lost on sensitive, state-specific fact patterns—can benefit from HHS setting a nationwide 
policy that may help standardize and make transparent hospitals’ and state administrators’ 
decision-making processes.
Another option is the qui tam suit,296 in which a private citizen brings suit under the 
False Claims Act against persons who presented false claims for payment to, or otherwise 
defrauded, the Federal treasury.297 In qui tam actions, the plaintiff does not defend a private 
right, but the interest of the public in general in place of the government, to enforce a 
policy explicitly formulated by legislation.298 Under this theory, when a hospital violates 
employment nondiscrimination conditions attached to their receipt of federal funding by 
refusing a physician’s application for admitting privileges because they provide abortion,299 
an injured physician may bring a qui tam suit for damages against the hospital. Qui tam suits 
are not without disadvantages. First, the False Claims Act authorizes a damages remedy, 
not injunctive relief.300 This may be cold comfort to the physician whose livelihood has 
been eliminated and whose patients might not be able to access abortions. The government 
may also intervene in the action, and moreover may settle the suit with the defendant after 
a hearing or even terminate the action, regardless of the preferences of the plaintiff.301 
However, the plaintiff’s incomplete control over the proceedings is counterbalanced by the 
government’s attention and, with it, governmental resources that may be available for the 
action.302 
296 See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General Evidence from Qui 
Tam Litigation, 112 colum. l. rev. 1244 (2012).
297 Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 yale l.J. 341, 343 (1989).
298 Id. at 345 (quoting Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
299 In the case of the Church Amendments, these conditions extend to the Public Health Service Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm (2012), the Community Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2689 (2012), and the 
Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000–81 (2012). 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300a-7(c) (2012).
300 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
301 Michael R. Dorfman, Qui Tam: Fighting the Uphill Battle Against Health Care Fraud, 77 u. det. mercy 
l. rev. 927, 938 (2000). 
302 Id. at 940.
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of abortion’s legality, demand persists.303 Increasing restrictions on women’s 
access to abortion due to state laws correlates with the growth of a black-market economy 
in abortion drugs.304 A woman faced with dwindling options may resort to taking these 
drugs without proper instruction or supervision, leading to health complications.305 TRAP 
laws thus perversely foreclose one of safest paths available to women to ensure their own 
bodily and decisional autonomy. 
Reproductive rights advocacy is more urgent than ever. Testimony from obstetrician- 
and gynecology-certified physicians and the managers of Whole Women’s Health revealed 
that the admitting-privileges provision has the effect of preventing at least 22,286 women 
annually from procuring an abortion.306 Aside from the direct effects of these TRAP laws, 
a culture of shaming from hospitals can deter new doctors from entering this line of work. 
Of several doctors who had worked with Whole Women’s Health before, two were not 
interested in joining the clinic due to fear that “future changes in the law would make it 
impossible to provide abortions in the state”; another because he feared that involving 
himself in abortion would cost his future obstetrics practice; another operated at a Catholic 
hospital which directed the doctor to stop speaking to Whole Women’s Health and 
eventually fired him; and another concluded that obtaining admitting privileges would be 
impossible given the caseload requirements at one of the local hospitals, while the other is 
a Catholic hospital that declines to grant admitting privileges on the basis of an applicant’s 
association with abortion practice.307 These testimonies show that the admitting-privileges 
requirement deploys nongovernmental social and economic pressures to create barriers to 
becoming or remaining an abortion provider. 
303 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Legal or Not, Abortion Rates Compare, n.y. tImes (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/10/12/world/12abortion.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/HDC3-8AGW].
304 See, e.g., Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of DIY Abortion in Texas, atlantIc (June 27, 2014, 9:00 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/ 
[http://perma.cc/A3K4-XNR5]; Fiona Keating, Black Market Abortion Drugs Trade Increases as US Clinics 
Close at Record Rate, IBtImes (Jan. 18, 2015 6:04 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/black-market-abortion-
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As passage of restrictive state regulations accelerates, the undue burden standard is 
being applied in district and circuit courts around the country.308 Its track record, however, 
is troubling. While in certain cases the standard remains a powerful tool to protect women’s 
autonomy,309 all too often the standard provides little guidance to courts, resulting in 
inconsistent outcomes. As of the date of this printing, Whole Woman’s Health has been 
argued in the Supreme Court, with numerous amici on both sides offering divergent and 
even contradictory views to the conversation.310 The case presents an opportunity not only 
for the Court to reaffirm the balance between the state’s interest in regulating medical 
procedures and a woman’s right to choose an abortion, but to clarify the the undue burden 
standard.311
As it stands, “undue burden” is not the only tool we have. In this Note, I have proposed 
four additional methods of challenging admitting-privileges decisions, focusing mainly 
on a constitutional attack of improper delegation violating the Due Process Clause. Legal 
advocates considering strategies to defend against overly burdensome abortion regulations 
may benefit from a close consideration of whether these tactics might be useful in their 
particular circumstances. 
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8, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/courts-state-abortion-laws-114068.html [http://perma.cc/ 
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whole-womans-health-v-cole/ [https://perma.cc/TZR9-JW5J] (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
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